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  As presidents make ever more expansive claims of executive power, 
Congress’s ability and willingness to counter the executive is often 
limited. That makes all the more significant instances when Congress 
does overcome structural and political challenges to pass legislation to 
rein in the president. But thanks to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of 
legislative vetoes in INS v. Chadha, such congressional actions are 
necessarily subject to presidential veto. President Donald Trump, for 
example, vetoed joint resolutions aimed at restraining executive action 
relating to the border wall and war powers. Although vetoed bills are 
not binding law, this Article argues that neither are they legal nullities; 
instead, judges, executive branch lawyers, and other interpreters can 
use majoritarian congressional opposition to the executive as an 
interpretive tool. The result is a novel “Youngstown canon of 
construction”: when Congress passes a bill or resolution by a majority 
of both houses and the president exercises the veto, preventing the act 
from becoming law, then the expressed congressional opposition to the 
president’s view should be used to narrowly construe the underlying 
statutory or constitutional authority the president is claiming, if that 
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authority is ambiguous. The proposed canon would help to counteract 
overbroad claims of executive power in important areas such as war 
powers, the National Emergencies Act, treaty termination, and the 
scope of federal preemption of state laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Congress can’t agree on much these days, and it’s no secret that 
the legislature often has trouble reining in a determined president. But 
sometimes, at least, it tries. In several recent instances, Congress 
passed resolutions aimed at restraining the Trump administration. 
President Donald Trump, however, vetoed Congress’s efforts. He 
issued the first veto of his presidency to defeat a joint resolution that 
would have terminated the national emergency he declared to pave the 
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way for constructing a border wall.1 He vetoed another joint resolution 
directing the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from hostilities in 
Yemen,2 and yet another directing termination of hostilities with Iran 
in the wake of the killing of Major General Qassem Soleimani.3  
In litigation over the border wall, the Trump administration 
argued that “Congress’s failed attempt to override the President’s veto 
of its disapproval of the national emergency declaration does not have 
the force of law or in any way restrict authority Congress previously 
granted to the Executive.”4 The first part of that sentence is correct as 
a matter of Supreme Court precedent. Legislative acts usually become 
binding law only if they are passed by majorities of both houses of 
Congress and signed into law by the president, or enacted by a 
supermajority of Congress after a presidential veto.5 The vetoed joint 
resolutions were not. But is it really true that they cannot in any way 
cabin the executive?  
This Article argues that in certain cases, courts, executive branch 
lawyers, and other interpreters can and should consider vetoed bills 
when construing the scope of presidential powers.6 It proposes a 
Youngstown canon of construction, drawing inspiration from the 
insight in Justice Robert Jackson’s Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case)7 concurrence that “[p]residential 
powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or 
conjunction with those of Congress.”8 The Youngstown canon would 
instruct that when Congress passes a bill or resolution by a majority of 
both houses and the president vetoes it, then the expressed 
 
 1. See infra notes 242–55 and accompanying text.  
 2. See infra notes 199–207 and accompanying text. 
 3. Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval Legislation To Terminate the Use 
of United States Armed Forces in Hostilities Against Iran, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (May 
6, 2020) [hereinafter Iran Veto]; see also S.J. Res. 68, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2020) (directing the 
termination of use of U.S. forces for hostilities with Iran).  
 4. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 27–28, Sierra 
Club v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-00892).  
 5. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“If any Bill shall 
not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been 
presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the 
Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.”). 
 6. This Article builds upon ideas I first set out in a blog post. Kristen Eichensehr, What To 
Do with Vetoed Bills, JUST SEC. (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63380/what-to-do-
with-vetoed-bills [https://perma.cc/2NYQ-6EZR].  
 7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 8. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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congressional opposition to the president’s view should be used to 
narrowly construe the underlying statutory or constitutional authority 
the president is claiming if that authority is ambiguous.9 Using 
Youngstown as a canon of construction provides a way to account for 
congressional opposition to exercises of presidential power while also 
complying with the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha,10 
which held that legislative acts that do not comply with bicameralism 
and presentment cannot be legally binding.11 The canon steers a middle 
course between treating vetoed bills as legal nullities and equating 
them with enacted statutes. It instructs that these bills are legally 
relevant as an input into statutory or constitutional construction 
without being legally binding.  
Congress’s attempts to restrain the Trump administration bring to 
the fore a larger problem: over the course of decades, the executive 
branch has accumulated power in ways that deviate from the allocation 
of authority that the Constitution envisions and contravene Congress’s 
intent in coupling statutory delegations with legislative checks, later 
invalidated by the Supreme Court. Trump was not the first president 
to make expansive claims of executive power, and he won’t be the last. 
The Youngstown canon can help to recalibrate the balance of power in 
Congress’s favor and gird against future executive excesses.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I defines and explains 
the Youngstown canon and offers four normative justifications for its 
use. Part II explores the canon’s practical application through several 
illustrative examples drawn from actual and hypothetical cases, 
including war powers, the National Emergencies Act (“NEA”), 
congressional action to block treaty termination, and the scope of 
federal preemption. Part III considers several likely concerns with the 
Youngstown canon and speculates about the possible consequences of 
its adoption. 
 
 9. I use “ambiguity” throughout this Article in the general sense often employed by courts 
and commentators to denote various forms of indeterminacy and uncertainty. See Lawrence B. 
Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 97 (2010) 
(explaining that “[i]n ordinary speech, . . . vagueness and ambiguity . . . are sometimes used 
interchangeably, and, when this is the case, they both mark a general lack of what we might call 
‘determinacy’ (or ‘clarity’ or ‘certainty’) of meaning”). 
 10. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 11. Id. at 951.  
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I.  YOUNGSTOWN AS A CANON 
The Youngstown canon both draws inspiration from Justice 
Jackson’s iconic concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case) and sheds light on how best to apply 
it.12 This Part reviews the Youngstown decision, defines and situates the 
Youngstown canon, and offers several justifications for the canon’s use. 
A. Youngstown and Congressional Opposition 
In the midst of the Korean War and a labor dispute between steel 
workers and mill owners, President Harry Truman issued an executive 
order directing the secretary of commerce to seize control of U.S. steel 
mills to avert a work stoppage.13 The mill owners, including 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., sued, and in an opinion by Justice 
Hugo Black, the Court held the president’s order unconstitutional.14 
Over time, Jackson’s concurring opinion has come to overshadow 
the majority.15 Drawing on his prior experience as an executive branch 
 
 12. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring); see infra Part I.C.4 (discussing 
how the canon clarifies the application of Jackson’s tripartite Youngstown framework). Scholars 
of a more formalist or originalist bent have objected to Jackson’s approach. See, e.g., Robert J. 
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority To Conduct Military 
Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or Support Them, 25 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 512–13 (2002) (noting that they “do not believe that Justice 
Jackson’s approach in Youngstown accurately captures the separation of powers”); Saikrishna 
Bangalore Prakash, Zivotofsky and the Separation of Powers, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 29–30 
(critiquing Jackson’s three-part framework on a variety of grounds, including that it is “quite 
vacuous” and “something of a doctrinal Rorschach test”). For purposes of this Article, I take as 
a given the conventional wisdom about the importance of Jackson’s opinion to separation of 
powers jurisprudence. See infra note 15 (collecting sources). 
 13. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582–84.  
 14. Id. at 587, 589.  
 15. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
94 (2d ed. 1996) (calling Jackson’s opinion “a starting point for constitutional discussion of 
concurrent powers”); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over 
International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1257 (2018) (calling Jackson’s framework 
“canonical”); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2314 (2006) (calling Jackson’s Youngstown opinion “the most celebrated 
judicial opinion of the separation-of-powers canon”); Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy 
of Youngstown, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 266 (2010) (calling Jackson’s tripartite framework 
“Youngstown’s enduring legacy”); id. at 269–70 (collecting quotations praising Jackson’s 
opinion); see also Kristen E. Eichensehr, Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 
85 U. CHI. L. REV. 609, 619–20 (2018) [hereinafter Eichensehr, Conduct of Foreign Relations] 
(noting that nineteen Supreme Court majority opinions, numerous Supreme Court separate 
opinions, and dozens of Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) opinions had cited Jackson’s 
concurrence through early 2018). Through the end of the Supreme Court’s 2019 term in summer 
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lawyer,16 Jackson noted “the poverty of really useful and unambiguous 
authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they 
actually present themselves.”17 And he set out to create some.18 
Jackson described a tripartite framework for evaluating claims of 
executive power. In Category One, “the President acts pursuant to an 
express or implied authorization of Congress,” and “his authority is at 
its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus 
all that Congress can delegate.”19 In Category Two, “the President acts 
in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority,” and 
he is therefore in a “zone of twilight” where the executive and 
Congress “may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution 
is uncertain.”20 In Category Two, “congressional inertia, indifference 
or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if 
not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”21 
Finally, in Category Three, “the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,”22 and 
therefore, “his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon 
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
 
2020, the statistic on citations to Jackson in majority opinions remains unchanged, but the opinion 
has garnered additional citations in significant separate opinions. See Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140 
S. Ct. 2183, 2245 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing Jackson’s concurrence); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2137 n.42 (2019) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (same).  
 16. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing his prior experience as a 
“legal adviser to a President in time of transition and public anxiety”); see also id. at 647 (“[A] 
judge cannot accept self-serving press statements of the attorney for one of the interested parties 
as authority in answering a constitutional question, even if the advocate was himself.”).  
 17. Id. at 634. 
 18. The frequency with which courts and commentators cite Jackson’s opinion suggests that 
he succeeded, at least in creating a useful framework. Whether it is unambiguous is a separate 
matter.  
 19. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 20. Id. at 637. 
 21. Id. Jackson provides by far the least detail about the likely legal outcome with respect to 
Category Two. Instead of suggesting which way power leans, he notes “any actual test of power 
is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on 
abstract theories of law.” Id. Commentators have rightly criticized the ambiguity inherent in 
Jackson’s Category Two. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from 
Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 603 (2008) (“[T]he soft law analytic frame makes 
clear that Justice Jackson’s typology is actually incomplete. Speaking of congressional agreement, 
disapproval, or silence is unnecessarily crude. The House might authorize the presidential action 
and the Senate might expressly disavow it (or vice versa), creating a twilight of the twilight 
category.”). 
 22. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
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Congress over the matter.”23 Courts can uphold “exclusive Presidential 
control” in Category Three “only by disabling the Congress from 
acting upon the subject,” and executive actions in this category, 
Jackson warned, “must be scrutinized with caution.”24 Although the 
tripartite framework is, as Jackson himself recognized, “over-
simplified,”25 it nonetheless provides a useful structure for 
understanding the separation of powers.  
The framework’s central insight is that “[p]residential powers are 
not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or 
conjunction with those of Congress.”26 Key to applying the framework 
and defining the scope of presidential powers is understanding what 
counts as congressional action relevant to the Youngstown analysis. 
Jackson spoke of congressional authorization, “congressional grant or 
denial of authority,” and Congress’s “express or implied will.”27 The 
most authoritative expressions of congressional views are undoubtedly 
those contained in enacted laws or ratified treaties, granting or 
delegating authority to the executive to act or prohibiting specific 
actions. But Jackson went further, contemplating implied 
authorization or the implied will of Congress as well.28 Youngstown 
itself involved an implied prohibition by Congress. Three statutory 
schemes could potentially have allowed Truman to control the seized 
steel mills,29 but Truman did not follow any of the available statutory 
options.30 Instead, “[i]n choosing a different and inconsistent way of his 
own,”31 the president fell into Category Three.32 Still, in determining 
the implied will of Congress, Jackson extrapolated from enacted 
statutes, reasoning in a matter akin to the expressio unius est exclusio 
 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 637–38. 
 25. Id. at 635.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 637. 
 28. Cf. Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 123, 188 (1994) (“Youngstown recognized what Chadha failed to recognize: 
Congress’s ‘voice’ matters regarding the nature and scope of presidential power, and to hear that 
voice one must sometimes go beyond enacted authorizations or prohibitions.”). 
 29. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing statutes).  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. Indeed, as the majority opinion points out, Congress had considered and rejected a 
proposal to give the president authority to use governmental seizures “to solve labor disputes in 
order to prevent work stoppages.” Id. at 586 (majority opinion). 
 32. Id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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alterius canon of statutory construction that Congress’s approval of 
certain seizure mechanisms suggested its disapproval of others.33  
Decades after Youngstown, the Supreme Court entrenched 
enacted statutes as the nearly exclusive means by which Congress could 
act with binding legal effect.34 In Chadha, the Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of a one-house legislative veto35—one 
of hundreds of similar provisions that Congress had enacted in the 
twentieth century.36 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 
gave the attorney general discretion to suspend the deportation and 
adjust the status of deportable aliens in the United States to lawful 
permanent residents, pursuant to certain conditions.37 However, the 
INA specified that if either house of Congress passed a resolution 
disapproving “the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney 
General shall thereupon deport such alien.”38 Jagdish Rai Chadha was 
a deportable alien for whom an immigration judge and the attorney 
general recommended suspension of deportation.39 The House passed 
a resolution of disapproval,40 and the immigration judge reopened 
deportation proceedings.41 Chadha challenged the constitutionality of 
the one-house legislative veto,42 and ultimately, the Supreme Court 
agreed that the provision was unconstitutional.43  
In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court 
explained that “the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 
represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the 
Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely 
 
 33. Id. at 639; 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (7th ed. 2014) (“Expressio unius instructs that, where a 
statute designates a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and operation, and the 
persons and things to which it refers, courts should infer that all omissions were intentional 
exclusions.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 34. Senate approvals of treaties, which are governed by the procedures set out in Article II, 
remain unaffected by the Chadha analysis.  
 35. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983). 
 36. See id. at 944–45 (noting that the first legislative veto was enacted in 1932 and that 295 
such provisions had been enacted overall).  
 37. Id. at 923–25 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 244(a)(1), (c)(1)–(c)(2), 
8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), (c)(1)–(2) (1970)). 
 38. Id. at 925 (quoting INA § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2)).  
 39. Id. at 923–25.  
 40. Id. at 926–27. 
 41. Id. at 928.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
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wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”44 Congress cannot 
exercise legislative power except by complying with the bicameralism 
and presentment requirements set out in Article I.45 The Court 
recognized that “[n]ot every action taken by either House is subject to 
the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I,”46 but 
established a presumption that acts by Congress are legislative acts, a 
presumption confirmed by the one-house resolution at issue.47 The 
one-house resolution “was essentially legislative in purpose and effect” 
because it purported to “alter[] the legal rights, duties and relations of 
persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials 
and Chadha, all outside the legislative branch.”48 Moreover, “[t]he 
legislative character of the one-House veto” was “confirmed by the 
character of the Congressional action it supplants”: without the one-
house veto, Congress would have had to pass legislation to alter 
Chadha’s status.49 The Court soundly rejected “utilitarian” arguments 
that the usefulness of the legislative veto provision should save it from 
unconstitutionality.50  
The abiding lesson of Chadha is that legislative acts must conform 
to the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I, and, 
conversely, that attempted legislative acts that fall short of the Article 
I requirements cannot be treated as binding law. For the purposes of 
the Youngstown analysis, Chadha suggests that in most cases, what 
counts as congressional action is perfected legislative action—those 
actions that comply with Article I—and clear implications from 
enacted statutes, as evidenced by Youngstown itself.  
Chadha was enormously disruptive to a number of existing 
statutory schemes. As the Court itself noted, and Justice Byron White 
emphasized in dissent,51 Congress had used the Article I process to 
enact numerous delegations of power to the executive on the condition 
 
 44. Id. at 951.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 952. 
 47. Id. at 951–52. 
 48. Id. at 952. 
 49. Id. at 952–54.  
 50. Id. at 945.  
 51. Id. at 944–45; id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting) (“[O]ver the past five decades, the 
legislative veto has been placed in nearly 200 statutes . . . in every field of governmental concern: 
reorganization, budgets, foreign affairs, war powers, and regulation of trade, safety, energy, the 
environment, and the economy.” (footnote omitted)). 
EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2021  9:06 PM 
1254  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1245 
that the delegations were subject to legislative vetoes—ways for 
Congress to pull back power through mechanisms that were not subject 
to the presidential veto. Although Chadha itself dealt only with a one-
house legislative veto, the Court’s reasoning strongly suggests that 
other sorts of legislative vetoes, including two-house legislative vetoes, 
are similarly impermissible.52  
Enter the Youngstown canon. 
B. Defining and Situating the Youngstown Canon 
Canons of construction are judicially created principles that courts 
and other interpreters use to construe legal texts.53 Scholars often 
group canons into three categories: textual, substantive, and extrinsic.54 
Textual canons are “inferences that are usually drawn from the 
drafter’s choice of words, their grammatical placement in sentences, 
and their relationship to other parts of the statute.”55 Textual canons 
include maxims such as ejusdem generis56 and the rule against 
 
 52. Chadha formally involved a one-house negative legislative veto—that is, the statute 
“allow[ed] policy to be implemented unless Congress disapproves.” Gersen & Posner, supra note 
21, at 583. Nonetheless, its reasoning reached more broadly. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 523–24 (1992) (noting that 
Chadha’s “reasoning suggested the constitutional invalidity of two-house legislative vetoes and of 
legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking”); Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 583 (noting that the 
Supreme Court’s “reasoning clearly suggested that the positive legislative or two-house veto 
would be unconstitutional as well”). 
 53. See, e.g., ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 114 (2d ed. 2002) 
(“Canons of construction are judicially crafted maxims or aphorisms for determining the meaning 
of statutes.”); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 901, 905 (2013) (describing canons as “the default presumptions that judges apply to 
interpret ambiguous statutes”). 
 54. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA F. NOURSE, 
STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN 
THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 448–49 (2014) (describing the three categories); Gluck & Bressman, 
supra note 53, at 924–25 (describing the three categories); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering 
Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 833 (2017) (describing “language canons and 
substantive canons”). 
 55. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 448.  
 56. See 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 33, 
§ 47:17 (defining the canon to mean that “where general words follow specific words in an 
enumeration describing a statute’s legal subject, the general words are construed to embrace only 
objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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surplusage.57 Substantive canons are “presumptions about statutory 
meaning based upon substantive principles or policies drawn from the 
common law, other statutes, or the Constitution,”58 and they include 
well-known canons such as the rule of lenity and constitutional 
avoidance.59 Extrinsic canons or “extrinsic aids . . . are presumptive 
rules telling the interpreter what other materials might be consulted to 
figure out what the statute means,” including, most prominently, 
legislative history.60  
The proposed Youngstown canon falls in the second category. It is 
a substantive canon that provides a way to account for congressional 
opposition to presidential exercises of power when a presidential veto 
stymies Congress from perfecting its opposition. The Youngstown 
canon can be stated as follows:  
When Congress passes a bill or resolution by a majority of both 
houses and the president exercises the veto, preventing the act from 
becoming law, then the expressed congressional opposition to the 
president’s view should be used to narrowly construe the underlying 
statutory or constitutional authority the president is claiming if that 
authority is ambiguous.61  
The Youngstown canon provides a way to account for congressional 
opposition to the president when constitutional or statutory authorities 
are ambiguous, but importantly, the canon is consistent with Chadha. 
The canon does not purport to give binding legal effect to bills passed 
by both houses of Congress but vetoed by the president, which Chadha 
would prohibit.62 It respects the constitutional presentment 
requirement by maintaining a distinction between enacted laws, which 
have binding legal effect, and vetoed bills, which do not.63 But the 
 
 57. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 467 (describing the “presumption . . . that every 
word and phrase adds something to the statutory command” and that “[a] construction that would 
leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected”). 
 58. Id. at 448.  
 59. See, e.g., Krishnakumar, supra note 54, at 833–35 (citing these and other examples of 
substantive canons). 
 60. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 448–49.  
 61. See supra note 9 for the meaning of “ambiguity.”  
 62. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“It emerges clearly that the prescription for 
legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of 
the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively 
considered, procedure.”). 
 63. Cf. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 598 (identifying a “rule-of-law objection” or, some 
might say, formalist objection to using concurrent resolutions for interpretation on the grounds 
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canon suggests that vetoed bills can be one input into constructions of 
executive power and thereby have legal influence. In other words, the 
canon does not allow Congress to make law without the president, but 
it does ensure that Congress’s views can be taken into account, at least 
when the existence or scope of the underlying authority for the 
president’s action is ambiguous.  
Not all vetoed bills have constitutional salience. Some bills and 
subsequent vetoes rest on pure policy disagreements, having nothing 
to do with the separation of powers.64 Imagine, for example, that 
Congress passes a bill to raise taxes, and a president who campaigned 
on a no-new-taxes platform vetoes the tax hike.65 Other vetoes, 
however, involve constitutional conflicts.66 Consider, for example, 
vetoes asserting that Congress has infringed upon the executive’s war 
powers,67 power to conduct foreign relations,68 or vetoes preventing 
 
that “[i]f Congress can regulate with soft statutes, then the constitutional requirement of 
presentment is rendered void and the President’s role in producing legislation is eliminated”).  
 64. See, e.g., Memorandum of Disapproval on the “Interstate Recognition of Notarizations 
Act of 2010,” 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Oct. 8, 2010) (citing the need for “further 
deliberations about the possible unintended impact of H.R. 3808 . . . on consumer protections, 
including those for mortgages, before the bill can be finalized,” noting that “[t]he authors of this 
bill no doubt had the best intentions in mind when trying to remove impediments to interstate 
commerce,” and stating that the Obama administration “will work with them and other leaders 
in Congress to explore the best ways to achieve this goal going forward”).  
 65. Cf. Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Tax 
Fairness and Economic Growth Acceleration Act of 1992, 1 PUB. PAPERS 476, 477 (Mar. 20, 1992) 
(explaining the veto on the ground of policy disagreements with tax increases including that “[t]his 
is the wrong time to raise taxes, to increase the deficit, or to send a message of fiscal 
irresponsibility to financial markets”). One could argue that the Youngstown canon should apply 
even in such purely policy-based veto scenarios, but the justifications for considering the views of 
the later Congress on an existing statutory authority in such a case are, in my opinion, more 
subject to the criticisms associated with looking to subsequent legislative history. See infra notes 
130–32 and accompanying text. 
 66. I use “involve” here rather than “assert” because the relevance of the Youngstown canon 
should not depend on whether the president overtly cites constitutional objections in a veto 
message. To put it another way, presidents should not be able to prevent application of the 
Youngstown canon in constitutional disputes with Congress merely by avoiding citations to 
constitutional authorities in their veto messages. This concern is largely hypothetical as presidents 
are not shy about claiming that Article II supports their vetoes, see, e.g., infra notes 67–68, but it 
is worth flagging that the canon should not be so easily gamed or defeated. 
 67. See, e.g., Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 1 PUB. PAPERS 893 (Oct. 24, 1973) (raising 
objections to the War Powers Resolution); infra notes 199–207 and accompanying text (discussing 
the veto of a war powers-related resolution). 
 68. See, e.g., Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1567–68 (Nov. 
21, 1989) (objecting to statutory provisions that “threaten[] to subject to criminal investigation a 
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revisions to the scope of authority that Congress previously delegated 
to the president.69 The Youngstown canon has the most force in these 
sorts of conflicts. In separation of powers disputes, the majoritarian 
actions of Congress have constitutional relevance. With the president’s 
agreement or sufficient votes to override a veto, such actions set 
binding law. But even when they don’t result in binding law, the 
Youngstown canon affords them interpretive relevance.  
Judges use substantive canons, sometimes even the same 
substantive canon, in different ways. Judges may deploy a substantive 
canon “as a starting point for discussion, a balancing factor, or a 
decisive tiebreaker at the end of a discussion.”70 The Youngstown 
canon preserves this flexibility, allowing judges to tailor their 
application of the canon to their interpretive preferences and to the 
context of particular cases. A judge might cite the canon as a 
background principle to frame discussion of the level of deference due 
to the executive on claims about national security, and as a reason to 
curb such deference.71 Consider, for example, litigation about the 
Trump administration’s construction of the border wall that asks 
whether there is a national emergency that “requires the use of the 
armed forces” or whether constructing a border wall is a “military 
requirement.”72 Alternatively, a judge or other interpreter might reach 
for the Youngstown canon as a tiebreaker at the end of the analysis and 
use the canon to justify ruling against the executive only if ambiguity 
about the existence or scope of the executive’s authority remains after 
exhausting other, traditional tools of statutory construction. For 
 
wide range of entirely legitimate diplomatic activity, the authority and responsibility for which is 
vested in the executive branch by the Constitution”). 
 69. See, e.g., infra notes 242–55 and accompanying text (discussing the veto of a national 
emergency-related resolution). 
 70. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 492. For an example of differing applications of the 
same canon, compare Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998) (describing the rule 
of lenity effectively as a tiebreaker that “applies only if, ‘after seizing everything from which aid 
can be derived,’ . . . we can make ‘no more than a guess as to what Congress intended’” (quoting 
United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997)), with id. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(describing the rule of lenity in terms approaching a presumption against the government in 
criminal cases).  
 71. As will become clear in the applications of the canon discussed in Part II, many 
separation-of-powers disputes involve foreign relations or national security, areas in which judges 
often afford the executive considerable deference based on expertise and other rationales. See 
generally Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009) 
(discussing “national security fact deference” to the executive). 
 72. See infra Part II.B.  
EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2021  9:06 PM 
1258  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1245 
example, imagine a case in which the president argues that the Senate’s 
prior consent to ratification of a treaty that includes a termination 
clause impliedly authorizes the president to terminate that treaty 
unilaterally, despite a later attempt by Congress to forbid the president 
from terminating the very same treaty. Courts might deploy the 
Youngstown canon there to rule against the president’s claim that the 
treaty’s termination clause impliedly authorizes his actions and puts 
him in Youngstown Category One, and instead determine that the case 
must be decided in Youngstown Category Two.73  
The Youngstown canon can also interact with other canons, 
especially constitutional avoidance. Consider a case in which the 
executive argues that Congress has acquiesced in a claim of executive 
power. But Congress has passed and the president has vetoed bills that 
would have reined in executive action. Judges or other interpreters 
could cite the Youngstown canon for the proposition that the vetoed 
bills show that Congress has not acquiesced in the executive’s broad 
claim.74 Consideration of vetoed bills and Congress’s nonacquiescence 
would raise questions about the constitutionality of the president’s 
claim to power. Such questions in turn would trigger the canon of 
constitutional avoidance: “[W]here an otherwise acceptable 
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, 
the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such 
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”75  
 
 73. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see infra Part II.C. 
 74. For a detailed discussion of how the Youngstown canon interacts with historical gloss and 
claims of acquiescence, see infra notes 168–79 and accompanying text. 
 75. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997) (terming this 
“modern avoidance”); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 517 (explaining that “[u]nder 
modern avoidance, the court does not actually decide the constitutional question before moving 
to an alternative interpretation,” but instead “flags a potential constitutional question and so 
moves to an alternative interpretation to avoid having to address it”).  
The modern version of constitutional avoidance “supplanted” “classical avoidance,” which 
requires that “as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be 
unconstitutional and by the other valid, [the Court’s] plain duty is to adopt that which will save 
the Act.” Vermeule, supra (alteration in original) (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 
(1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)). As Professor Adrian Vermeule explains, “[t]he basic difference 
between classical and modern avoidance is that the former requires the court to determine that 
one plausible interpretation of the statute would be unconstitutional, while the latter requires 
only a determination that one plausible reading might be unconstitutional.” Id. The Youngstown 
canon and constitutional avoidance are similar in structure; both are “tool[s] for managing 
statutory ambiguity” that “do[] not eliminate ambiguity by resolving uncertainty about statutory 
meaning,” but rather “manage[] ambiguity by assigning a consequence to the uncertainty.” 
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The Youngstown canon could perhaps interact with constitutional 
avoidance in another way as well. When Congress has restrained the 
executive by statute, the executive may attempt to deploy 
constitutional avoidance in a “self-protective” way by “fabricating 
statutory ambiguity and exaggerating constitutional concerns” to 
trigger the canon of constitutional avoidance and justify narrowly 
construing the statutory restriction on executive power.76 If Congress 
has successfully enacted one restriction on the executive and then the 
president vetoes congressional attempts to tighten the restriction 
further, the same ambiguity that the executive would have to cite to 
trigger constitutional avoidance would similarly trigger the 
Youngstown canon, and, along with it, the need to consider Congress’s 
expressed opposition to the president’s view. In this way, the 
Youngstown canon could help to counteract executive abuse of 
constitutional avoidance in circumstances where Congress has 
repeatedly attempted to limit executive power. 
Importantly, judges are not the only interpreters who use canons. 
Congress knowingly drafts in the shadow of at least some canons,77 and 
executive branch lawyers also deploy canons of construction.78 In some 
cases, executive branch lawyers use canons in anticipation of litigation; 
if the United States will have to defend its constitutional or statutory 
interpretation in court, then it behooves executive branch lawyers to 
advise their clients on how judges are likely to view the interpretive 
question.79 At the same time, many executive branch constitutional and 
 
Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1189, 1240 (2006) (emphasis omitted).  
 76. Morrison, supra note 75, at 1236. 
 77. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 53, at 906–08 (summarizing canons that Congress 
knows and does not know).  
 78. See, e.g., Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal 
Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Att’ys of the Off. of the Assistant Att’y Gen., Re: Best Practices 
for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 2 (July 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf [https://perma.cc/G34K-LQ7D] 
(explaining that, with respect to statutory interpretation, “OLC’s analysis should be guided by the 
texts of the relevant documents, and should use traditional tools of construction in interpreting 
those texts”); Morrison, supra note 75, at 1218–19 (“The [constitutional] avoidance canon appears 
frequently in OLC opinions; like the courts, OLC tends to regard it as a ‘settled’ rule.” (quoting 
Limitations on the Detention Auth. of the Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 27 Op. O.L.C. 58, 61 
(2003))).  
 79. Cf. Morrison, supra note 75, at 1197 (arguing that when an agency knows that its 
statutory construction “will likely face judicial review, and if the reviewing court would 
predictably use a particular canon when construing the statute, then the agency has a tactical 
incentive to apply the canon even if the values supporting it apply only to the judiciary”). 
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statutory interpretations are not subject to judicial review because of 
issues of justiciability and standing, among others.80 In such cases, 
executive branch lawyers still have an independent duty to construe 
legal authorities accurately, and perhaps even a heightened duty of 
care because of the absence of independent judicial review.81 Thus, to 
the extent that particular canons facilitate reaching the best or most 
accurate understanding of legal authorities, executive branch lawyers 
should use them, even in instances where judicial review is unlikely or 
impossible. 
The proposed Youngstown canon is novel, but it is not unmoored 
from existing interpretive practice. As defined above, the Youngstown 
canon follows a well-trodden path of substantive canons that direct 
broad or narrow construction of statutes.82  
Using ambiguity as the trigger for applying the Youngstown canon 
is in line with other constitutionally inflected substantive canons,83 such 
as the principle of constitutional avoidance and the rule of lenity.84 
 
 80. Id. (noting that this is particularly true “[i]n matters implicating foreign affairs and 
national security” where “judicial review of executive branch statutory interpretation is extremely 
infrequent”). 
 81. Cf. The Const. Separation of Powers Between the President and Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 
124, 180 (1996) (explaining that where judicial review is unavailable or deferential “the executive 
branch’s regular obligation to ensure, to the full extent of its ability, that constitutional 
requirements are respected is heightened by the absence or reduced presence of the courts’ 
ordinary guardianship of the Constitution’s requirements”); Morrison, supra note 75, at 1224 
(“[T]he fact that the courts have essentially no role in implementing certain provisions of the 
Constitution does not license the executive branch to ignore those provisions. Instead, executive 
officials have a duty to abide by their own best understanding of the provisions.”). 
 82. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 490–91 (explaining that “[t]raditionally, the main 
substantive canons were directives to interpret different types of statutes ‘liberally’ or ‘strictly,’” 
and citing the examples that “statutes in derogation of the common law were to be strictly 
interpreted,” as are criminal statutes, per the rule of lenity). Substantive canons can also be 
phrased, however, as rebuttable presumptions or even as clear statement rules—“presumptions 
that can only be rebutted by express language in the text of the statute.” Id. at 492–93. And 
through court decisions, canons sometimes evolve from one framing to another. Id. at 493 (noting 
“some mobility in the Court’s articulation of these substantive canons” and citing the example of 
the transformation of the presumption against extraterritoriality from a presumption into a clear 
statement rule). 
 83. Of course, there exists some ambiguity about ambiguity. See generally Richard M. Re, 
Clarity Doctrines, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1497 (2019) (discussing the role of ambiguity and its 
counterpart, legal clarity). 
 84. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 562 (2012) (“[I]t is well 
established that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, 
courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so.”). Ambiguity is also the trigger for the rule 
of lenity. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 410 (2010) (discussing “the familiar 
principle that ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of 
EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2021  9:06 PM 
2021] THE YOUNGSTOWN CANON 1261 
Ambiguity is also the trigger for federalism canons,85 which are not only 
substantive canons, but also, like the Youngstown canon, address 
structural constitutional issues, albeit ones focused on the allocation of 
power between the federal government and the states instead of among 
branches of the federal government.86 
Giving interpretive effect to actions of Congress short of enacted 
legislation is not unique to this proposed canon.87 Consider, for 
example, the interpretive principle known as the rejected proposal 
rule.88 Pursuant to this principle, courts are reluctant to give a statute a 
meaning that Congress as a whole or even a congressional committee 
 
lenity’” (quoting Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000))). The rule of lenity is often 
explained as grounded in due process, specifically the need to put the public on fair notice of 
conduct that will be considered criminal. See, e.g., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) 
(applying the rule of lenity to narrowly construe a statute and explaining that “[a]lthough it is not 
likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals,” 
nonetheless “a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will 
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed”). 
 85. See Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 859–60 (2014) (specifying that “it is appropriate 
to refer to basic principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in a 
federal statute,” and explaining that “[i]n this case, the ambiguity derives from the improbably 
broad reach of the key statutory definition given the term—‘chemical weapon’—being defined” 
and “the deeply serious consequences of adopting such a boundless reading” before narrowly 
construing the statutory term); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (using ambiguity as 
the trigger for the federalism canon). 
 86. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000) (arguing 
that the nondelegation doctrine has persisted in “nondelegation canons” that “forbid 
administrative agencies from making decisions on their own” and instead require affirmative 
action by Congress). 
 87. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 631 (1992) (suggesting that 
the Supreme Court uses interpretive canons to “articulate and protect underenforced 
constitutional norms,” including the separation of powers).  
 88. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600–01 (1983) (reasoning that 
although “[o]rdinarily, and quite appropriately, courts are slow to attribute significance to the 
failure of Congress to act on particular legislation,” here, “[i]n view of its prolonged and acute 
awareness of so important an issue, Congress’ failure to act on the bills proposed on this subject 
provides added support for concluding that Congress acquiesced in [the agency interpretation at 
issue]”); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) (recounting how Congress, “with full and 
continuing . . . awareness,” allowed baseball “to develop and to expand unhindered by federal 
legislative action” to subject it to antitrust laws over the course of decades and concluding that 
Congress’s failure to pass “[r]emedial legislation [that] has been introduced repeatedly” 
constitutes “something other than mere congressional silence and passivity”); see also Abbe R. 
Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of 
Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 77 n.90 (2015) (“The Court has long applied a 
‘rejected proposal rule,’ under which it refuses to construe statutes to incorporate provisions that 
Congress has expressly rejected.”). 
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has considered and rejected.89 When courts rely on the rejected 
proposal rule, they give interpretive weight to proposed bills and 
amendments that Congress failed to adopt. If even congressional 
inaction and, as the rule’s name suggests, rejected proposals are 
relevant interpretive guides in some circumstances, then logically 
accepted proposals—congressional action by a majority vote of both 
houses—should also be a relevant and even a superior guide to 
congressional intent.90 The Youngstown canon relies on congressional 
action, not congressional disavowal or mere inaction. Short of 
overriding a veto, Congress cannot communicate its views any more 
clearly.  
In addition, the Supreme Court looks to congressional actions 
short of enacted legislation when interpreting ambiguous 
constitutional provisions. For example, in National Labor Relations 
Board v. Noel Canning,91 the Court considered the meaning of the 
Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause.92 The Court determined 
that the Constitution’s text was ambiguous with respect to whether 
presidents may make recess appointments during intrasession recesses 
and whether they may make recess appointments for vacancies that 
 
 89. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 
85 (1988) (describing the rejected proposal rule and noting “[w]here a committee, or one chamber 
of Congress, or a conference committee has voted against including specific language in a statute 
or an amendment to a statute, the Court will often refuse to read that interpretation into the 
statute”).  
Some rejected proposals may share similarities with vetoed bills. Consider a proposal 
discussed on the floor of both houses and voted down by a majority of each house. Such a 
circumstance shares a majoritarian aspect with the vetoed bill, albeit majoritarian opposition to 
action as well as bicameralism in a sense. Such characteristics might make courts and other 
interpreters give particular weight to the rejected proposal rule because it would be clear that the 
rejection resulted from significant congressional opposition, rather than some sort of preliminary 
vetogate. The rejected proposal rule and Youngstown canon could also apply together if, for 
example, the president sought statutory authorization from Congress, a majority of each house 
voted down the authorization, the president claimed authority from preexisting statutes, and then 
Congress attempted to rein in the president, provoking a veto. Both canons would operate to 
suggest the underlying statutory authority should be narrowly construed if, as seems likely, the 
existing authority is ambiguous.  
 90. Cf. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 610 (arguing that “if subsequent congressional 
silence . . . is ever relevant for statutory interpretation, surely congressional voice (in the form of 
soft statutes) should be as well” because while “Congress may not always have an incentive to 
express its views candidly, . . . there is no reason to think that voice approved by a majority will 
be usually less reliable than silence” (footnotes omitted)). 
 91. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014). 
 92. Id. at 518–19. 
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begin prior to a recess.93 Given the textual ambiguity, the Court “put 
significant weight upon historical practice,”94 including actions of 
Congress. Among the congressional actions the Court considered were 
those by Senate committees—that is, actions clearly lacking the status 
of law or even the majoritarian aspect required for consideration of 
congressional action pursuant to the Youngstown canon.95 
The proposed Youngstown canon is also consistent with scholarly 
proposals to give weight to congressional “soft law.”96 Soft law occurs 
in a variety of contexts,97 but Professors Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner 
 
 93. Id. at 556 (“[T]he Clause’s text, standing alone, is ambiguous. It does not resolve whether 
the President may make appointments during intra-session recesses, or whether he may fill pre-
recess vacancies.”). 
 94. Id. at 524 (emphasis omitted). 
 95. See id. at 530–32 (discussing a Senate Judiciary Committee Report for the meaning of 
“recess” in the Constitution as including both intersession and intrasession recesses); id. at 547 
(discussing a Senate Judiciary Committee Report regarding whether the Recess Appointments 
Clause permits presidential appointments to vacancies that begin prior to a recess); see also id. at 
531 (“[N]either the Senate considered as a body nor its committees, despite opportunities to 
express opposition to the practice of intra-session recess appointments, has done so.”); Curtis A. 
Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional 
Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 66 n.273 (arguing that “[t]he majority in Noel Canning 
may have given a nudge to the consideration of soft law in” referring to the practice of Senate 
committees in interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause). 
 96. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 612 (“A soft statute purporting to clarify the meaning 
of an earlier hard statute should not control if the text of the earlier statute is clear. In a case of 
statutory ambiguity however, a soft statute should be given weight.”). See generally Josh 
Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (2012) (discussing congressional soft 
powers alongside the legislature’s hard powers). In a related vein, Professor Abner S. Greene has 
proposed “[r]evising Chadha” such that, under certain circumstances, concurrent resolutions 
would be sufficient to block presidential actions. Greene, supra note 28, at 187, 193–95.  
My proposed Youngstown canon differs from Greene’s proposal in several ways. First, I 
focus primarily on constitutional questions, whereas he focuses in large part on statutory 
delegations. See id. at 193 (noting that he is “chiefly concerned” with “Rust-type case[s],” which 
involve a statutory delegation, though his “analysis applies . . . by analogy to the Youngstown-
type case as well”). Second, his proposal is, as he concedes, not consistent with Chadha because 
it would give binding effect to certain concurrent resolutions. See id. at 187 (discussing “[r]evising 
Chadha”); id. at 195 (summarizing his proposal as follows: “If the President (or any executive 
agency) promulgates a regulation pursuant to a law that neither expressly authorizes presidential 
resolution of the particular issue nor clearly resolves the issue as a matter of antecedent 
congressional intent, a subsequent concurrent resolution should be construed as sufficient to 
block the regulation”). By contrast, my proposal is consistent with Chadha because it argues not 
for giving binding legal effect to congressional actions short of enacted law, but only for using 
such actions as one input into the process of interpreting certain constitutional or statutory 
provisions. In other words, vetoed bills can have legal influence, despite the fact that they do not 
have binding legal effect. 
 97. For discussions of soft law in the international and foreign relations law contexts, for 
example, see generally Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 
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apply it to Congress, focusing in particular on congressional 
resolutions.98 They define “soft law” as “a rule issued by a lawmaking 
authority that does not comply with constitutional and other 
formalities or understandings that are necessary for the rule to be 
legally binding.”99 Simple resolutions (passed by one house of 
Congress) and concurrent resolutions (passed by both houses of 
Congress, but not presented to the president) meet this definition,100 
and Gersen and Posner push back on what they label “[t]he 
conventional wisdom . . . that such measures lack importance because 
they do not create binding legal obligations.”101 Instead, they 
“advocate[] greater use of soft statutes by Congress and greater 
reliance on soft statu[t]es by courts” in both statutory interpretation 
and constitutional cases.102  
Although Gersen and Posner do not discuss vetoed bills,103 such 
bills or joint resolutions meet their definition of soft law: they are 
issued by Congress, but the lack of presidential signature renders them 
not legally binding.104 In fact, vetoed bills present a stronger case for 
interpretive consideration than the simple and concurrent resolutions 
on which they focus. Vetoed bills are proto-laws. The legislators who 
 
CORNELL L. REV. 735 (2014); Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 
2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171 (2010); and Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International 
Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581 (2005). 
 98. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 577–78 (identifying congressional resolutions as a 
type of soft law). 
 99. Id. at 579 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).  
 100. Id. at 580 (noting that they focus on “[t]wo prime examples of soft legislation”: simple 
resolutions passed by one house of Congress and concurrent resolutions passed by both houses 
of Congress (but not presented to the president)). 
 101. Id. at 578.  
 102. Id. at 617; see also id. at 607 (arguing that for statutory interpretation, a soft statute can 
be “useful” if it “reveals the legislative intent” underlying a “hard statute” that is relevant to 
interpretation of that hard statute or “if a later Congress’s policy views are relevant for 
interpreting or construing the earlier statute”). But see Rankin M. Gibson, Congressional 
Concurrent Resolutions: An Aid [to] Statutory Interpretation?, 37 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 421, 482–83 
(1951) (arguing against the use of concurrent resolutions to interpret previously enacted statutes).  
 103. Greene similarly does not explicitly address the interpretive effect of vetoed bills, but he 
seems implicitly to include vetoed bills through an unorthodox redefinition of concurrent 
resolutions. See Greene, supra note 28, at 193–94 (arguing that “only concurrent resolutions 
should suffice” as evidence of congressional intent, but noting that he “would count as a 
concurrent resolution any bill that gains majority support in both Houses, whether the bill is styled 
as a Concurrent Resolution and not submitted to the President, or styled as an Act or Joint 
Resolution and is submitted to the President”). 
 104. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 579.  
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voted for them intended them to be legally binding, but were thwarted 
by a presidential veto. The choice of a form of congressional action that 
can lead to enacted law sends a stronger signal of commitment on the 
part of Congress than even a concurrent resolution passed with the 
same majorities of both houses of Congress. The concurrent resolution, 
unlike the vetoed bill or joint resolution, was not designed to be, 
intended to become, or indeed capable of becoming legally binding.  
The choice to use a bill or joint resolution instead of a concurrent 
resolution is not pure or costless signaling. In many cases, there may be 
uncertainty about a president’s reaction to a bill that passes both 
houses of Congress.105 There is at least some probability that the 
president will sign the bill into law (perhaps with a signing statement), 
such that legislators would have to live with the legally binding 
enactment. The choice of a potentially legally binding form of 
congressional action raises the stakes for Congress and makes it less 
likely that the legislature is engaged in cheap talk.106 As Gersen and 
Posner explain, simple and concurrent resolutions are not costless for 
Congress to adopt.107 Bills and joint resolutions are even more costly.  
C. Justifying the Youngstown Canon 
A variety of normative justifications support application of the 
Youngstown canon. The justifications range from the theoretical to the 
pragmatic, and the persuasiveness of each will depend to some extent 
on one’s methodological priors. One’s approach to interpretation may 
suggest a narrower or broader scope for application of the canon, but 
the reasons for applying the Youngstown canon are strongest in 
circumstances involving areas of shared constitutional power where the 
 
 105. In recent decades, the executive branch has typically conveyed its views on significant 
bills via the issuance of a Statement of Administration Policy (“SAP”) prepared by the Office of 
Management and Budget. See generally MEGHAN M. STUESSY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44539, 
STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44539.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5LP5-QPW6] (describing when and the process by which SAPs are produced). 
SAPs include the extent to which the president supports or opposes particular provisions or entire 
bills and may include veto threats. Id. at 1–3. Even when a SAP is issued for a particular bill, 
however, uncertainty may remain about whether the president will ultimately veto the bill if 
passed by Congress. Id. at Summary (explaining that when a SAP includes a veto threat “it 
appears in one of two ways: (1) a statement indicating that the President intends to veto the bill, 
or (2) a statement that agencies or senior advisors would recommend that the President veto the 
bill” and that “[t]hese two types indicate degrees of veto threat certainty”). 
 106. See infra notes 330–36 and accompanying text. 
 107. See infra notes 330–31 and accompanying text.  
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allocation of authority between the legislature and the executive is 
unsettled. Such cases may involve direct constitutional disputes or 
statutory questions that nonetheless implicate such constitutional 
questions.  
1. Preserving the Separation of Powers and Constitutional Design.  
One argument in favor of the Youngstown canon stems from the need 
to preserve checks and balances within the federal constitutional 
design. The Framers designed the Constitution with the aim of 
ensuring that the branches would check each other and so guard the 
liberty of the people.108 This design is particularly salient where the 
Constitution divides authority over particular domains between 
multiple branches or gives competing powers to different branches, 
leaving ultimate authority underspecified.109 The evident appeal of this 
structure is that the branches can effectively fight out constitutional 
disputes amongst themselves.  
But the experience of U.S. government has come far from 1789. 
As Jackson noted in Youngstown, there is a “gap . . . between the 
President’s paper powers and his real powers,” and “[v]ast accretions 
of federal power . . . have magnified the scope of presidential 
activity.”110 That statement is even truer today. The executive has 
structural advantages over Congress that enable it to act quickly, 
definitively, and often independently of the legislature.111 As Professor 
 
 108. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320, 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(explaining that “maintaining . . . the necessary partition of power among the several 
departments, as laid down in the Constitution” requires “contriving the interior structure of the 
government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of 
keeping each other in their proper places” and that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract 
ambition”); see also Greene, supra note 28, at 125 (“To the extent that there is any ‘original 
understanding’ of the division of power between the President and Congress, it is that both are to 
be feared, neither is to be trusted, and if either one grows too strong we might be in trouble.”). 
 109. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704–05 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
when an individual challenges governmental action “on grounds unrelated to separation of 
powers, harmonious functioning of the system demands that we ordinarily give some deference, 
or a presumption of validity, to the actions of the political branches in what is agreed, between 
themselves at least, to be within their respective spheres,” but when a challenge “pertains to 
separation of powers, and the political branches are . . . in disagreement, neither can be presumed 
correct”). 
 110. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 653 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 111. See, e.g., EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT OFFICE AND POWERS: HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS OF PRACTICE AND OPINION 200 (2d ed. 1941) (noting with respect to foreign policy 
that “the President has . . . certain great advantages” including “the unity of office, its capacity for 
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Louis Henkin explained, “[c]oncurrent power often begets a race for 
initiative and the President will usually ‘get there first.’”112  
Perhaps the biggest change since the Framing period, however, 
has been the rise of the party system.113 Party loyalties have ensured 
that, contrary to the Framers’ vision of interbranch competition, 
sometimes Congress helps the executive along in aggrandizing power 
at the expense of the legislature.114 This is particularly likely when there 
is unified government, where one party controls both Congress and the 
presidency, making wins for one branch political wins for the other as 
well.115 
The long, slow drift of power toward the executive for reasons of 
institutional design and party politics means that Congress faces an 
uphill battle when it attempts to assert its institutional interests as 
distinct from those of the president. The institutional interests of 
Congress and the president are especially likely to be in opposition—
at least when there is divided government—on issues of concurrent 
constitutional powers, when both branches have some claim to power 
but its allocation between the two is unclear. In such cases, it becomes 
particularly important to understand Congress’s institutional 
perspective.  
 
secrecy and despatch, and its superior sources of information; to which should be added the fact 
that it is always on hand and ready for action, whereas the houses of Congress are in adjournment 
much of the time”); Eichensehr, Conduct of Foreign Relations, supra note 15, at 653–54 
(discussing the executive’s structural advantages over Congress); Terry M. Moe & William G. 
Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 133 (1999) 
(arguing that “the president’s formal capacity for taking unilateral action, and thus for making 
law on his own” is “so central to an understanding of presidential power, that it virtually defines 
what is distinctively modern about the modern American presidency”); cf. NLRB v. Noel 
Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 532 (2014) (“[T]he Senate cannot easily register opposition as a body to 
every governmental action that many, perhaps most, Senators oppose.”). 
 112. HENKIN, supra note 15, at 93. 
 113. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 15, at 2313 (“Political competition and cooperation 
along relatively stable lines of policy and ideological disagreement quickly came to be channeled 
not through the branches of government, but rather through an institution the Framers could 
imagine only dimly but nevertheless despised: political parties.”). 
 114. Cf. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that the “rise of 
the party system has made a significant extraconstitutional supplement to real executive power” 
and that with “[p]arty loyalties and interests, sometimes more binding than law,” the president 
can “extend his effective control into branches of government other than his own and . . . often 
may win, as a political leader, what he cannot command under the Constitution”). 
 115. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 15, at 2329 (arguing that “when government is 
unified . . . , we should expect interbranch competition to dissipate,” and instead will see 
“[i]ntraparty cooperation (as a strategy of interparty competition) smooth[] over branch 
boundaries and suppress[] the central dynamic assumed in the Madisonian model”). 
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A superficially attractive approach for discerning Congress’s 
views would be to look to enacted laws. However, considering only 
enacted laws is an insufficient and inaccurate method of determining 
Congress’s perspective because—unless adopted over a presidential 
veto—enacted laws necessarily take into account the views of the 
president. The president is part of the legislative bargain needed to 
enact law, and so statutes reflect a compromise position.116 Presidents 
have many mechanisms, such as executive orders, signing statements, 
and the like, through which to express their positions independent of 
Congress. Considering executive views expressed through such 
mechanisms plus enacted laws effectively double counts the position of 
the executive. Focusing only on enacted laws as a proxy for 
congressional views, therefore, risks systematically skewing the 
balance of constitutional powers in favor of the executive.117  
To capture the views of the legislature requires looking to other 
congressional actions,118 and the Youngstown canon helps to explain 
where one should look—namely, vetoed bills. Vetoed bills in areas of 
constitutional controversy are likely to more accurately convey the 
institutional views of Congress than enacted bills do, because vetoed 
bills do not reflect compromise—or at least, not much compromise—
with the executive. It is possible that they include some attempt by 
Congress to anticipate and account for executive views in the hope of 
gaining presidential signature, but they are generally less influenced by 
executive views than enacted statutes to which the president agreed.  
For similar reasons, Gersen and Posner argue that congressional 
resolutions “more accurately convey[] information about 
congressional views than hard law does,” especially “in domains where 
Congress acts without the President’s cooperation,” such as “when it 
expresses its views about its constitutional role.”119 At least until the 
 
 116. See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 719 (1992) (“[I]n the U.S. federal system, the President exercises 
considerable influence over legislation and is, therefore, a member of most enacting coalitions.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 614 (“Exclusive reliance on hard statutes 
will produce a body of constitutional law that is biased and incomplete.”). 
 118. Professor Oona Hathaway has recently proposed other ways to empower Congress to 
act as an institutional counterweight to the executive, including establishing a congressional OLC 
that could issue authoritative opinions on legal questions and counter the pro-executive tilt of the 
Department of Justice OLC. Oona A. Hathaway, National Security Lawyering in the Post-War 
Era: Can Law Constrain Power?, 68 UCLA L. REV. 2, 83–88 (2021).  
 119. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 594; see also id. at 617 (“[S]oft statutes will generally 
be a superior mechanism for expressing legislative interpretations of the Constitution than 
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Youngstown canon is broadly adopted,120 congressional resolutions 
may be an even purer indication of congressional views than vetoed 
bills because they do not attempt to gain presidential assent. But 
something is lost with nonbinding resolutions as well: because they 
have no possibility of becoming binding law, Congress may not take 
them as seriously or view them as an appropriate vehicle for expressing 
serious constitutional claims. Nonetheless, both nonbinding 
congressional resolutions and vetoed bills are better sources for 
discerning the institutional views of Congress than enacted statutes, 
which necessarily reflect an executive perspective as well.  
The Youngstown canon’s instruction to consider Congress’s views 
helps to ensure that, in areas of shared, divided, and contested power, 
interpreters can take into account Congress’s perspective, thus 
rebalancing the skew that comes from overreliance on enacted law. 
Doing so helps to preserve the balance of powers set out in the 
adversarial constitutional system. 
2. Respecting the Democratic Pedigree of Vetoed Bills.  The 
democratic pedigree of vetoed bills provides an additional justification 
for considering them in interpreting ambiguous provisions. Vetoed 
bills are majoritarian and thus on more robust democratic footing than 
other sources, like committee reports, floor statements, and 
congressional inaction, that courts and other interpreters often 
reference to understand Congress’s views.121 Considering 
congressional views expressed by vetoed bills as a canon of 
construction provides a way to give some meaning to congressional 
actions that would have constitutional significance, but for a 
presidential veto.122 Such actions, of course, are not sufficient to make 
new law.123 But at the same time, the views of Congress on the 
 
committee hearings, floor speeches, confirmation hearings, committee reports, hard statutes, or 
the failure to enact hard statutes.”). 
 120. The canon’s adoption could decrease existing incentives for Congress to proceed via 
concurrent resolutions and instead prompt more frequent pushes to pass bills, even if the 
president ultimately vetoes them. See infra Part III.C. 
 121. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 612 (“Unlike other forms of legislative history—
commonly given weight by judges already—the soft statute is majoritarian and provides a better 
indication of congressional intent than congressional silence or inaction.”); see also supra notes 
87–90 and accompanying text (discussing congressional inaction and the rejected proposal rule). 
 122. For data on the frequency with which presidents veto legislation (and the frequency with 
which Congress overrides such vetoes), see MEGHAN M. STUESSY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22188, 
REGULAR VETOES AND POCKET VETOES: IN BRIEF 3–7 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RS22188.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD6B-624T].  
 123. See supra notes 34–52 (discussing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983)). 
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constitutional allocation of powers between branches of the federal 
government, expressed through a democratically legitimate vehicle, 
can cast light on constitutional debates.  
Imagine, for example, a case in which the president argues that 
Congress has long acquiesced in unilateral executive action in a 
particular area. Majoritarian objection by Congress in the form of a 
bicamerally adopted bill—even if vetoed by the president—would 
provide strong evidence of Congress’s nonacquiescence in the 
president’s claim of authority. That nonacquiescence should be 
relevant for a court or executive branch interpreter in assessing 
historical gloss–related arguments about the validity of the president’s 
claim. Or consider a case in which the president asserts that he is acting 
pursuant to a statutory delegation of power, but is pushing or possibly 
exceeding the delegation’s bounds. Here, Congress’s adoption of a bill 
to refute the president’s reading of the scope of the delegation could 
serve as some evidence that the executive’s reading is not the best or 
even a permissible one.124 Assuming the president vetoes the bill, the 
Youngstown canon could be one consideration tipping the interpretive 
scales against the president by, for example, counteracting some of the 
usual deference courts afford the executive in national security or 
foreign relations cases.  
The alternative of treating constitutional views expressed by a 
majority of both houses of Congress as a legal nullity is deeply 
unsatisfying. It seems especially odd to ignore congressional opposition 
to presidential action when that opposition is equal or greater in 
magnitude to the congressional action that the president claims puts 
him in Youngstown Category One. This would occur in instances where 
a president claims authority to act based on a statute, passed by a 
majority of both houses of Congress and signed by the president, but a 
subsequent Congress votes by an equal or greater majority to deny the 
president’s authority to act. The only difference in the two situations is 
the view of the president; the intensity of the congressional view is at 
least equal across cases, if not greater in the subsequent attempt to 
restrict the president. In such a case, Chadha instructs that the later 
congressional opposition cannot be treated as binding law; it cannot 
undo an earlier delegation, absent presidential signature or a veto 
override. But the Youngstown canon charts a middle course. In such an 
instance, if there is ambiguity in the president’s claim of authority—
 
 124. See infra notes 208–14 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the 2002 Iraq 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) to justify hostilities against Iran). 
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whether based in a statute or the Constitution—then Congress’s later 
majoritarian opposition can shade the interpretation of the underlying 
authority. In other words, the Youngstown canon suggests that the 
president does not get the benefit of the interpretive doubt. Majority 
action by Congress can inflect interpretation in these circumstances. 
Using the expressed views of Congress—as reflected in majoritarian 
congressional action—as an interpretive tool to construe the scope of 
executive power bolsters the Constitution’s allocation of powers to 
multiple branches of the federal government.125  
The justification for valuing congressional views might be further 
strengthened if the congressional opposition to the president is 
bipartisan or otherwise crosses party lines, as in the case of 
majoritarian congressional opposition in a time of unified government. 
The existence of such opposition suggests both that the legislature’s 
view results from something more than politics126 and that it may 
represent a broad coalition, potentially enhancing its democratic 
pedigree.127 At the same time, when government is divided—that is, 
when one party controls Congress and the opposite party holds the 
presidency—majoritarian action by Congress that falls purely along 
party lines should not be dismissed out of hand as mere politics. The 
congressional opposition may rest on strong constitutional objections, 
but the pull of party discipline may be even stronger.128 In other words, 
congressional opposition that is not just bicameral but also bipartisan 
could act as a plus factor, strengthening the case for taking seriously 
Congress’s views, but it is not a prerequisite.129  
 
 125. Cf. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959–60 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that 
because “Congress has included the [legislative] veto in literally hundreds of statutes, dating back 
to the 1930’s[,] Congress clearly views this procedure as essential to controlling the delegation of 
power to administrative agencies” and that the Court should afford Congress the “respect due its 
judgment as a coordinate branch of Government” by deciding the case narrowly). 
 126. See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text (distinguishing vetoes that are purely 
policy based from those that involve separation-of-powers disputes). 
 127. Cf. Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1249 (2006) (“Given the diverse and eclectic makeup of Congress, any policy 
approved by that body will likely include a greater range of voices and input than a unilateral 
decision by the president.”). 
 128. Cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 15, at 2352 (explaining that “[i]f a partisan majority in 
Congress generally shares the President’s ideological and policy goals, abdication [of 
congressional prerogatives] might further the party’s interest in uniting behind the President”). 
 129. Notably, Professors Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes propose that courts should 
consider whether government is unified or divided in construing statutes related to executive 
authority. Id. at 2354. Specifically, drawing on Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, they propose, 
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One might reasonably wonder whether considering vetoed bills is 
a species of subsequent legislative history. The Supreme Court has 
“often observed . . . that ‘the views of a subsequent Congress form a 
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.’”130 The 
hazard is at least twofold. First, even among those whose interpretive 
approaches allow resort to congressional intent, “the legislative ‘intent’ 
relevant to statutory interpretation is the intent of the enacting 
Congress, not the continuing intent of subsequent Congresses.”131 And 
second, as a practical matter, subsequent legislative history “is highly 
unreliable and subject to strategic manipulation.”132  
As explained above, however, the views of Congress as expressed 
in vetoed bills need not fall prey to these criticisms of subsequent 
legislative history. The purpose of looking to vetoed bills is not to 
discern the intent of the enacting Congress. Courts and executive 
 
“When it is not clear whether congressional statutes prohibit the executive action at issue or 
simply do not address it, and Congress is controlled by the President’s political party, perhaps 
courts should . . . tilt[] toward prohibiting presidential action (particularly when that action 
amounts to a novel expansion of executive power).” Id. They also recognize “the flipside” of this 
rule, namely “that courts should more generously construe statutes as supporting executive 
authority when government is divided.” Id. Although this proposal could encourage presidents to 
obtain congressional authorization during times of unified government, id. at 2354, 2356, it raises 
a number of difficulties. It could exacerbate the drift in power to the executive by incentivizing 
the president to seek broad statutory authorizations during unified government that will be 
difficult to pull back later and encouraging the president to push legal boundaries during times of 
divided government with the knowledge that he can veto any restrictions Congress attempts to 
adopt. Another challenge may come from courts’ likely reaction to the proposal. As Levinson 
and Pildes themselves recognize, “it is hard to imagine courts expressly making legal doctrine turn 
on the partisan configuration of government (though it is easier to imagine them doing so sub 
rosa).” Id. at 2355. More fundamentally though, allowing the content of law to vary based solely 
on the political characteristics of the branches of the government, not any change to the law itself, 
creates due process-related challenges about notice and predictability. By contrast, the 
Youngstown canon asks courts and other interpreters to consider formal action by Congress—the 
passage of bills or joint resolutions. Although bipartisanship may provide evidence of the legal 
nature of congressional opposition and the breadth of the coalition supporting it, the proposed 
canon does not require courts to take politics or the existence of unified versus divided 
government into account. 
 130. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 355 (1998) (quoting United States 
v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348–49 (1963)); see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 
1731, 1747 (2020) (“[S]peculation about why a later Congress declined to adopt new legislation 
offers a ‘particularly dangerous’ basis on which to rest an interpretation of an existing law a 
different and earlier Congress did adopt.” (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 
496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990))). 
 131. Eskridge, supra note 89, at 95; see also Gibson, supra note 102, at 483 (“A subsequently 
passed concurrent resolution should not be accepted as persuasive evidence of the legislative 
intent in fact existing at the time of the enactment of a public law.”). 
 132. Eskridge, supra note 89, at 95. 
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interpreters can and should look to Congress’s views for reasons other 
than discerning the intent of the Congress that initially enacted a 
statute. For many of the cases in which vetoed bills are at issue, the 
relevant text is the Constitution, not (or not exclusively) a statute.133 In 
such cases, dismissing the views of the current Congress as mere 
subsequent legislative history would miss the point. Congress’s action 
can be treated not as subsequent legislative history, but as current 
constitutional prerogative—as nonacquiescence to executive power 
grabs and legislative explication of the separation of powers. To be 
sure, Congress’s views need not be determinative of the interpretive 
question at issue. Clear text—whether statutory or constitutional—will 
control. But where the relevant authority is unclear, there is no reason 
to exclude from consideration the views of Congress on a separation of 
powers question. 
Moreover, for all its frequent statements about the hazards 
attending subsequent legislative history, the Court does rely on at least 
certain kinds of such history with some frequency. This is particularly 
true with respect to interpretive inferences from legislative inaction, 
where courts interpret a statute passed at Time One in light of 
subsequent Congresses’ failures to act at Times Two, Three, etc.134 
Professor William Eskridge argues that “most of the legislative 
inaction cases . . . are inconsistent with the traditional proposition that 
the legislative ‘intent’ relevant to statutory interpretation is the intent 
of the enacting Congress, not the continuing intent of subsequent 
Congresses.”135 True, but such cases often cite congressional inaction 
not really for the purpose of determining congressional intent in the 
traditional sense—that is, the intent of the enacting Congress about a 
statute’s meaning at the time of passage. Rather, they look to 
Congress’s later inaction as evidence of congressional acquiescence in 
or approval of the actions of another branch, be it the judiciary or the 
 
 133. See infra Part II.B. 
 134. See Eskridge, supra note 89, at 84–85 (“In many of its acquiescence and reenactment 
cases, the Court fortifies its argument that legislative inaction has ratified the existing 
interpretation by pointing to the rejection of the opposite interpretation by either the enacting 
Congress or a subsequent one.”); see, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 
120, 143–44 (2000) (citing Congress’s failure to adopt bills granting the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) authority to regulate tobacco to support the holding that FDA lacked 
such authority); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) (discussing legislation that failed to pass 
in Congress over a period of fifty years). 
 135. Eskridge, supra note 89, at 95. 
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executive.136 By a similar token, one could consider the subsequent 
views of Congress, as expressed in vetoed bills, when they show 
congressional nonacquiescence or disapproval of another branch’s 
action.137 Looking to such congressional action also mitigates a 
pragmatic concern with drawing meaning from congressional 
inaction—namely, that it can be difficult to discern why Congress chose 
not to act.138 With vetoed bills, such an assessment is unnecessary: 
Congress has acted. 
3. Redressing Bargains Disrupted by Chadha.  To push the 
argument further, another justification for applying the Youngstown 
canon even in certain cases involving purely statutory delegations of 
power rests on the idea of partially redressing the tremendous 
disruption to interbranch bargains that the Supreme Court caused in 
Chadha. The Court’s decision to invalidate legislative vetoes severely 
disrupted the allocation of power that Congress had intended in 
numerous statutory schemes.139 In hundreds of statutes, Congress 
delegated authority to the executive with the understanding that it 
could pull back that authority via mechanisms, like concurrent 
resolutions, that are not subject to presidential veto. Chadha rendered 
unconstitutional the legislative vetoes through which Congress had 
intended to police executive power; and in a later case, Alaska Airlines 
 
 136. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 144 (explaining that Congress’s later passage 
of specific statutes relating to tobacco regulation (and failure to pass statutes giving the FDA 
broad authority to regulate tobacco) “have effectively ratified the FDA’s long-held position that 
it lacks jurisdiction under the . . . [original statute] to regulate tobacco products”); Flood, 407 U.S. 
at 283–84 (deeming Congress’s failure over decades to overturn prior statutory interpretation 
decisions “positive inaction” and arguing that Congress “has clearly evinced a desire not to 
disapprove them legislatively”). 
 137. See supra notes 87–90 (discussing the rejected proposal rule as an example of an existing 
interpretive principle relying on congressional inaction and the Youngstown canon’s reliance on 
affirmative congressional action). 
 138. Eskridge, supra note 89, at 98 (identifying realist problems with inferring legislative 
intent from legislative inaction, in particular “problems of inference” in determining “[w]hat, in 
fact, does the inaction mean?”).  
 139. For a compilation of statutory provisions impacted by Chadha, see THOMAS J. 
WICKHAM, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS, H.R. DOC. 
NO. 115-177, at 1147–1338 (2019). Searching for “Chadha” highlights numerous statutory 
provisions affected by the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the legislative veto. For an explanation 
of the congressional practice of legislative vetoes post-Chadha, see generally LOUIS FISHER, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22132, LEGISLATIVE VETOES AFTER CHADHA (2005), http://
www.loufisher.org/docs/lv/4116.pdf [https://perma.cc/QM4Q-RARE]. 
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v. Brock,140 the Court then “applied the standard severability test in a 
way that rendered all or virtually all legislative vetoes severable from 
their statutes.”141 The two decisions taken together have locked in 
delegations to the executive that Congress had intended to subject to 
ongoing congressional monitoring and clawback. Now, Congress can 
only readjust these delegations if the president agrees or if it can secure 
a supermajority to overcome a presidential veto.  
Although this category of cases involves statutory delegations of 
power to the executive, there is a strong argument that even if later 
vetoed bills attempting to pull back on the delegations are technically 
subsequent legislative history, considering Congress’s later expressed 
views is the least courts can do given that Chadha fundamentally 
disrupted the balance of power Congress intended to maintain. The 
operative text being interpreted in these cases is statutory—the scope 
of the statutory delegation—but the fundamental principles at issue are 
constitutional. The constitutional significance becomes apparent when 
looking at particular statutes that fall in this category, including the 
NEA and the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”), which are discussed 
in detail below.142  
In practice, applying the Youngstown canon in this set of cases will 
interact with a severability analysis. Courts apply a presumption in 
favor of severability and follow a set of “fairly well established” rules, 
even if judges do not always apply them consistently.143 In Alaska 
Airlines, the Court explained that the severability analysis turns on 
congressional intent.144 The Court will decline to sever an 
unconstitutional provision “if the balance of the legislation is incapable 
of functioning independently” or if the remaining statute “is legislation 
 
 140. Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 697 (1987) (severing a legislative veto provision 
because the Court “cannot conclude that Congress would have failed to enact the Airline 
Deregulation Act . . . if the legislative veto had not been included”). 
 141. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 52, at 524. 
 142. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 143. Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 884 
(2005); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 529–30 (2014) (noting that the Supreme Court 
“has not always applied consistent criteria to decide” severability questions and instead “applies 
what have been identified as multiple tests,” including (1) “whether the statute works without the 
severed portion in the way that Congress intended”; (2) “whether Congress would have enacted 
the law absent the severed provisions”; (3) “whether the remaining provisions are capable of 
functioning independently”; and (4) whether Congress included “a severability clause in the statute 
itself declaring Congress’s intentions”). 
 144. See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684.  
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that Congress would not have enacted.”145 The Court explained that 
“[t]he more relevant inquiry in evaluating severability is whether the 
statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of 
Congress.”146 With respect to severing unconstitutional legislative veto 
provisions, the Court was not blind to the separation of powers 
consequences of its Chadha decision, instead noting that “the absence 
of the veto necessarily alters the balance of powers between the 
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Federal Government.”147 
The Court explained that with respect to legislative vetoes, courts 
should “consider the nature of the delegated authority that Congress 
made subject to a veto” because “[s]ome delegations of power to the 
Executive . . . may have been so controversial or so broad that Congress 
would have been unwilling to make the delegation without a strong 
oversight mechanism.”148  
The Youngstown canon could interact with severability analysis in 
two ways. First, and most straightforwardly, the views of the current 
Congress on a prior delegation of authority—when that authority was 
made subject to a legislative veto later rendered unconstitutional—
could be considered as part of the analysis of the “nature of the 
delegated authority” per Alaska Airlines.149 Congressional attempts to 
push back on continued executive exercise of previously delegated 
authority in these circumstances may be taken as evidence that 
Congress would not have delegated in the first instance, and, therefore, 
that the presumption in favor of severability should be overcome. 
Here, the Youngstown canon’s instruction to consider Congress’s 
vetoed views functions as a counter-canon to the presumption in favor 
 
 145. Id. at 684–85; see also Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 235, 291 (1994) (“A court can hold an invalid provision of a statute severable if: 
(1) the remaining statute functions as a coherent whole; and (2) the evidence does not show that 
Congress would not have enacted the statute absent the invalid provision.”); Metzger, supra note 
143, at 884 (“Severability in regard to federal statutes is ostensibly a question of congressional 
intent and functionality: Would Congress have enacted the remaining provisions without the 
severed portions, and can the remaining portions function independently?”); Vermeule, supra 
note 75, at 1950 (“[C]ourts presume that the constitutionally valid applications of statutes should 
be severed from any constitutionally invalid applications, leaving the valid applications in force, 
unless Congress would not have intended the valid applications to stand alone.”). 
 146. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685; see also Gluck, supra note 88, at 92 (explaining that “the 
presumption in favor of severability . . . centers almost entirely on the question of whether 
excising only the objectionable part of a statute will allow it to ‘function’ as ‘Congress intended’”). 
 147. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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of severability. Alternatively, even if the Youngstown canon’s focus on 
the current views of Congress is regarded as insufficient to rebut the 
presumption in favor of severing the unconstitutional legislative veto, 
the canon could nonetheless be deployed to narrowly construe the 
delegated authority in the remaining part of the statute, to the extent 
that such authority is ambiguous.  
Used in either fashion, the majority votes of both houses of 
Congress that form the basis for the relevant action for the Youngstown 
canon are clearer expressions of Congress’s views than the imaginative 
speculation that severability doctrine currently directs judges to 
undertake. Severability doctrine asks courts to engage in a hypothetical 
and counterfactual inquiry about “what the legislature would have 
done” if it had known that courts would hold a provision 
unconstitutional, “not what the legislature actually did.”150 This inquiry 
“often calls for rank speculation.”151 Better than such speculation is the 
Youngstown canon’s ability to account for Congress’s perspective, 
expressed in a majoritarian process and subsequent to understanding 
the invalidity of the legislative veto provision that the enacting 
Congress intended to ensure an ongoing check on the executive.152 
 
 150. Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 744 (2010); see also 
Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2350 (2020) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining that “absent a severability or nonseverability clause, a court often cannot really know 
what the two Houses of Congress and the President from the time of original enactment of a law 
would have wanted if one provision of a law were later declared unconstitutional” and noting that 
“this formulation often leads to an analytical dead end”).  
 151. Walsh, supra note 150, at 753; see also John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. 
REV. 203, 211 (1993) (criticizing the “present test for severability” on the ground that “in asking 
what the legislature would have done if it had known that part of a law would be invalidated, the 
test calls for an ‘answer’ that is often little more than speculation”); Caleb Nelson, What Is 
Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 405 (2005) (“[C]ourts conducting severability analysis routinely 
have to speculate about how the enacting Congress would have answered a question that it did 
not actually face.”).  
 152. Scholars have noted severability doctrine’s risk to the balance of powers between the 
legislature and judiciary. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 145, at 292–93 (noting that severability 
doctrine’s “heavy bias towards finding statutes severable threatens the separation of powers 
between Congress and the judiciary” because in severing unconstitutional provisions, the court 
“substitutes a judicially rewritten law”). This risk is further heightened where the statute the 
judiciary is rewriting implicates the balance of powers between the political branches. Although 
use of the Youngstown canon in these circumstances may be subject to the subsequent legislative 
history critique discussed above, see supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text, an exception to 
this critique may be warranted given the Court’s creation of and reliance on an amorphous test 
of imaginative construction of supposed congressional views. The question becomes whose views 
should be substituted for those of the enacting Congress: The judiciary’s or a later Congress’s? 
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4. Clarifying Application of the Youngstown Framework.  A final 
justification for and benefit of the Youngstown canon stems from its 
interaction with Jackson’s Youngstown framework. Despite its 
frequent invocation and canonical status,153 Jackson’s tripartite scheme 
is rather underspecified and, as Jackson himself called it, “over-
simplified.”154 The framework is underspecified especially with respect 
to Category Two cases, where it provides little guidance on case 
outcomes and even on the nature of the category itself.155 Professor 
Laurence Tribe has criticized “the nearly sacrosanct triptych” as 
“deeply ambiguous on the key question of what to make of 
congressional silence.”156 The framework is oversimplified in 
suggesting that the three categories are clearly divisible. Rather, as the 
Supreme Court itself later explained, “executive action in any 
particular instance falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but 
rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit 
congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition.”157 
The Youngstown canon can help clarify application of Jackson’s 
Youngstown framework in at least two ways.  
First, the Youngstown canon suggests a way—consistent with 
Chadha—to address congressional opposition in cases where the 
president claims implied authorization from Congress. Jackson 
included within Category One instances where “the President acts 
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.”158 The 
most significant case in which the Supreme Court has found implied 
authorization is Dames & Moore v. Regan.159 There, the Court assessed 
the lawfulness of executive actions related to the Iran hostage crisis, 
 
Especially in separation of powers disputes between the executive and the legislature, considering 
the view of Congress—any Congress—may be preferable. 
 153. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 154. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 635 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 155. See Eichensehr, Conduct of Foreign Relations, supra note 15, at 652–55 (discussing 
indeterminacy with respect to Youngstown Category Two). For an illuminating study of the 
diverse ways that lower federal courts approach and attempt to avoid Youngstown Category Two, 
see Michael Coenen & Scott M. Sullivan, The Elusive Zone of Twilight, 62 B.C. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3583471 [https://
perma.cc/89PL-GUZD].  
 156. Laurence H. Tribe, Transcending the Youngstown Triptych: A Multidimensional 
Reappraisal of Separation of Powers Doctrine, 126 YALE L.J. F. 86, 91 (2016). 
 157. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).  
 158. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
 159. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
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including whether the president could suspend claims against Iran that 
remained pending in U.S. courts. The Court considered several statutes 
and determined that none “constitute[d] specific authorization of the 
President’s action suspending claims.”160 Nonetheless, the Court 
considered them “highly relevant in the looser sense of indicating 
congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in 
circumstances such as those presented in this case.”161 The Court also 
noted a lack of congressional opposition and a “history of 
congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the 
President.”162 In tension with Youngstown itself, where close-but-not-
quite statutes were cited as evidence that Congress had rejected the 
president’s claimed authority, the Court in Dames & Moore concluded 
that “the President was authorized to suspend pending claims” and that 
“Congress may be considered to have consented to the President’s 
action.”163  
The idea of implied authorizations being sufficient for Category 
One may be troubling in and of itself.164 Category One, after all, comes 
with “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial 
interpretation.”165 Presidents have an incentive to attempt to claim that 
Congress has impliedly authorized their actions, putting them in 
Category One. And courts may have an incentive to accept such claims 
because it simplifies their ultimate task of resolving the 
constitutionality of executive action, rather than admitting that 
 
 160. Id. at 677.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 678–79. 
 163. Id. at 686.  
 164. Cf. Tribe, supra note 156, at 92–93 (arguing that the bicameralism and presentment 
requirements “exist both to prevent the gradual deformation of our governmental structure and 
to protect individual liberty,” and that “[b]y ignoring these obstacles, Jackson’s celebrated 
Youngstown concurrence invites courts to give the force of law to extra-constitutional 
congressional action by directing judicial attention to the ineffable, and judicially constructed, 
‘implied will of Congress’ rather than to the actual terms of duly enacted laws” (footnote 
omitted)). Tribe’s main concern seems to be that considering the implied will of Congress 
empowers Congress to avoid bicameralism and presentment. I see a comparatively greater risk in 
the executive over-claiming authorization from Congress and convincing courts that executive 
action falls in Category One, with its thumb on the scale in the president’s favor, rather than 
Category Two. 
 165. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 637 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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Congress is silent and grappling with the indeterminacy of Youngstown 
Category Two.166  
But for congressional prerogatives, implied authorizations are 
especially problematic. By definition, such cases rely on actions by 
Congress that do not authorize presidential action, perhaps combined 
with congressional inaction, which may be constitutionally meaningful 
or may simply result from institutional challenges and political 
gridlock. Here, the Youngstown canon can help. The canon ensures 
that explicit congressional action, even when vetoed by the president, 
counts in the Youngstown calculus. 
Imagine a case in which the president appears poised to claim 
implied congressional authorization for a particular action that he 
could not take acting alone or that at least would be on shaky 
constitutional ground if done based solely on executive power. 
Congress then reacts by passing a bill explicitly denying the president 
the authority, but the president vetoes the bill. If there is ambiguity 
about the scope of the president’s constitutional authority, as there 
often would be in this situation, the Youngstown canon instructs courts 
to construe the president’s claimed authority narrowly. The canon 
therefore ensures that congressional opposition—expressed in a 
majoritarian fashion—is weighed against executive claims of implied 
authorization. The canon does not give the vetoed bill binding legal 
effect, which would run afoul of Chadha, but it ensures that the most 
explicit and on-point expression of Congress’s views on a particular 
executive action can influence assessments of implied authorization 
and congressional acquiescence.  
In some ways, Dames & Moore was an easy case for implied 
authorization because Congress had not objected in any way to the 
president’s settlement of the hostage crisis or earlier claims settlements 
by the executive. The Court noted that “Congress has not enacted 
legislation, or even passed a resolution, indicating its displeasure with 
the Agreement,” and “[w]e are thus clearly not confronted with a 
situation in which Congress has in some way resisted the exercise of 
Presidential authority.”167 The Court’s suggestion that even a 
nonbinding resolution might have been sufficient to alter its analysis 
 
 166. Cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 15, at 2353–54 (arguing that to avoid “Justice Jackson’s 
purgatorial ‘zone of twilight,’ . . . judges frequently attribute to vague legislation a ‘clear’ 
congressional endorsement (or sometimes, a ‘clear’ congressional prohibition) of the executive 
action at issue”). 
 167. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 687–88 (emphasis added). 
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lends credence to the Youngstown canon’s approach. Neither 
congressional action—a resolution or a vetoed bill—would necessarily 
be determinative of the outcome of the ultimate constitutional 
question, but both could be relevant. 
Second, the Youngstown canon can help to clarify the application 
of the Youngstown framework through its interaction with historical 
gloss. The idea of historical gloss is often traced to Justice Felix 
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Youngstown. Frankfurter 
explained, “Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting 
government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they 
give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”168 He counseled 
that  
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in 
by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution . . . may 
be treated as a gloss on “executive Power” vested in the President by 
§ 1 of Art. II.169  
Historical gloss can be relevant to any of Jackson’s three Youngstown 
categories. Longstanding practice can demonstrate congressional 
approval or disapproval of executive action as required for Categories 
One and Three, or a longstanding practice of congressional silence may 
be evidence of the distribution of constitutional authority in the 
Category Two “zone of twilight.”170 The “most common reason” for 
invocation of historical practice in separation of powers disputes is “the 
idea that the cited practice involves the ‘acquiescence’ of one branch 
in the actions of the other”—typically, congressional acquiescence in 
the executive’s actions.171  
Invocations of historical gloss raise the issue of what it means for 
Congress to “question” executive practice. The clearest mechanism for 
Congress to question or register objections to executive action is, of 
course, enactment of a law, either with the president’s concurrence or 
over the president’s veto. As explained above, however, in 
constitutional clashes where Congress and the president have 
conflicting institutional interests, it is unrealistic to expect much 
 
 168. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
 169. Id. at 610–11. 
 170. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 419 (2012); Eichensehr, Conduct of Foreign Relations, supra note 
15, at 621–22. 
 171. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 170, at 414. 
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evidence of this sort. The president is unlikely to agree with laws 
cabining executive power, and expecting Congress to act with a 
supermajority of both houses is asking too much. Looking only to 
enacted law to discern the views of Congress then risks skewing 
constitutional analysis sharply in favor of the executive. For these 
reasons, as well as more general concerns about institutional structures 
that make it difficult for Congress to enact even routine legislation,172 
scholars argue for looking beyond enacted law to congressional “soft 
law” to discern whether Congress has questioned executive practice.173 
As Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison explain, “[t]he 
greatest risk” with respect to Youngstown Category Two cases “is in 
too readily concluding that Congress has remained silent . . . , and 
consequently inferring acquiescence from such purported silence.”174  
Considering the views of Congress expressed in vetoed bills 
alongside other soft law mechanisms helps to remedy the tendency to 
equate a lack of enacted bills with a lack of congressional objection. 
The views of Congress expressed in a vetoed bill may not be enough to 
put a president into Category Three on their own (depending on one’s 
constitutional interpretation methodology), but at the very least, they 
can weaken a president’s claim to be in Category Two. Majority action 
by both houses of Congress is hard to characterize as congressional 
silence, as required for Category Two. Other types of soft law, such as 
committee reports or one-house resolutions, are subject to the critique 
that they do not represent Congress’s institutional views, and thus that 
even in the face of such action, Congress as a whole has perhaps been 
silent. But even if one disregards such actions in considering historical 
gloss or assessing congressional silence or acquiescence, vetoed bills, 
like concurrent resolutions, surmount that critique. Majority action by 
both houses is the antithesis of silence.  
To return to the critiques of Youngstown noted above, the effect 
of the Youngstown canon on traditional Youngstown analysis is easier 
to grasp by moving beyond the “over-simplified” idea that the three 
Youngstown categories represent rigid differentiations. The canon 
works best if the framework is understood to represent a spectrum. 
Application of the canon moves the president down the spectrum and 
 
 172. See id. at 440–47 (discussing impediments to congressional actions, such as vetogates and 
collective action problems). 
 173. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 95, at 66 (“[E]vidence of congressional nonacquiescence 
should extend beyond the enactment of opposing statutes and should include various forms of 
congressional ‘soft law,’ such as committee reports and nonbinding resolutions.”). 
 174. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 170, at 450.  
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further away from congressional authorization, in the case of the 
implied Category One cases, or further away from congressional 
silence and toward congressional prohibition in the case of the 
Category Two cases where historical gloss is most prevalent. One could 
argue, in line with the simplified three-category approach, that the 
canon knocks the president from Category One into Category Two, or 
from Category Two into Category Three. Depending on one’s 
preferred method, that approach may be attractive. But it is also 
subject to the possible formalist objection that it gives too much legal 
effect to congressional action short of law. Understanding the 
Youngstown framework as a spectrum on which there are many shades 
of gray largely moots this objection. 
An important caveat is in order. The Youngstown canon’s focus 
on vetoed bills is likely to favor Congress in most cases, but that may 
not be uniformly true. Having interpreters look to vetoed bills may 
simultaneously encourage them to look at presidential veto messages 
or other executive expressions of constitutional objections to vetoed 
bills.175 For example, Chief Justice John Roberts’s recent majority 
opinion in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau176 
cited constitutional objections in an Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) 
opinion and a veto message from President Ronald Reagan to an 
earlier bill about a different federal agency as support for holding 
unconstitutional the for-cause removal protection afforded to the 
director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.177 One could 
imagine constitutional battle waged between the branches where on a 
particular issue Congress repeatedly passes bills that presidents of both 
parties consistently veto, along with veto messages explaining the 
executive’s constitutional objections. A long-standing practice of 
executive vetoes of a particular congressional initiative on 
constitutional grounds could influence a historical gloss analysis by 
showing a consistent executive view of the issue over time, agreement 
among presidents of different parties, or a lack of acquiescence by the 
 
 175. For examples of veto messages, see U.S. Senate, Vetoes, 1789 to Present, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/vetoCounts.htm [https://perma.cc/STY3-62WA].  
 176. Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).  
 177. Id. at 2201 (discussing constitutional objections to the structure of the Office of the 
Special Counsel (citing Memorandum Op. from the Gen. Couns., Civil Serv. Comm’n, 2 Op. 
O.L.C. 120, 122 (1978); Memorandum of Disapproval on a Bill Concerning Whistleblower 
Protection, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1391–92 (Oct. 26, 1988))); see also id. at 2192 (holding that the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau director “must be removable by the President at will”). 
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executive in Congress’s constitutional views.178 Looking to vetoed bills 
as interpretive aids may therefore not be an unalloyed good for 
Congress to the extent that it also prompts courts and other 
interpreters to consider countervailing and unilateral executive 
views.179 For courts and for the rule of law, however, greater clarity 
about the branches’ views is a net benefit, regardless of the precise 
outcome of the congressional–presidential power struggle. 
*   *   * 
The proposed Youngstown canon is just that—a canon of 
construction. For that reason, some may regard it as a weak bulwark 
against executive aggrandizement. Canons sometimes fall to 
countercanons180 or suffer inconsistent application by courts.181 But 
using attempted congressional opposition as an interpretive aid, rather 
than a legally binding rule, is precisely the feature of this Article’s 
proposal that allows it to comply with Chadha. Considering 
congressional opposition as one among a number of factors or 
interpretive principles that courts and other interpreters should take 
into account is an improvement over disregarding such opposition as 
an irrelevant nullity.  
 
 178. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s 
Youngstown opinion and historical gloss); see also infra note 333 (discussing OLC’s reliance on 
consistent practice of presidents of different parties in historical gloss analysis). 
 179. Courts already occasionally rely on unilateral executive expressions of constitutional 
views on statutes. See, e.g., Seila, 140 S. Ct at 2202 (citing signing statement by President Bill 
Clinton that “questioned the constitutionality” of the single-director structure of a federal 
agency); cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 523 (2010) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (citing the absence of a constitutional objection in a signing statement by President 
George W. Bush as support for the lack of constitutional problem with a two-level for-cause 
removal protection). 
 180. For the canonical discussion of canons and countercanons, see Karl N. Llewellyn, 
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are 
To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950), setting out a number of canons in “thrust 
but parry” format. But see, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1191 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (arguing that “[o]f course there are pairs of maxims 
susceptible of being invoked for opposing conclusions,” but “[o]nce it is understood that meaning 
depends upon context, and that contexts vary, how could it be otherwise?”). 
 181. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 89, at 91 (“For every case where the Court rhapsodizes 
about deliberative inaction, there is a counter-case subjecting such inferences to scathing 
critique.”); id. app. at 1–3 (showing the Supreme Court applying and failing to apply canons based 
on legislative inaction); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 53, at 951 (“[F]ederal courts are 
notoriously inconsistent in their application of the canons . . . .”). 
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The Youngstown canon is also insulated from some critiques 
lodged against other canons. It is based, by definition, on congressional 
action, not congressional silence.182 And it’s the kind of canon that may 
become known to and internalized by Congress.183 Professors Abbe 
Gluck and Lisa Bressman have shown that congressional drafters are 
aware of and draft legislation with a view toward some substantive 
canons, including federalism presumptions, which are similar to the 
Youngstown canon in seeking to preserve structural constitutional 
values.184 In fact, Congress may already anticipate some form of a 
Youngstown canon. Some proposed bills that seek to push back on 
executive action—and that may be in the category of future vetoed 
bills—would authorize litigation on the part of Congress, during which 
counsel for Congress would likely argue to courts about congressional 
opposition.185  
II.  APPLICATIONS 
Building on the definition of the Youngstown canon in Part I, this 
Part explores how the canon could apply in practice. It provides four 
illustrative examples of ways the canon might apply in areas of shared 
constitutional power where the allocation of authority between 
Congress and the president is unsettled.  
 
 182. Cf. Eskridge, supra note 89, at 90–108 (discussing a variety of problems with inferring 
legislative intent from congressional inaction). 
 183. For a seminal study on congressional awareness of canons and other interpretive rules, 
see generally Gluck & Bressman, supra note 53. For a discussion of how adopting the Youngstown 
canon might influence congressional behavior, see infra Part III.C. 
 184. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 53, at 942 (explaining that “some kind of courts-Congress 
interpretive feedback loop does exist, at least with respect to certain interpretive rules,” including 
“federalism presumptions”). 
 185. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 4, 116th Cong. § 4 (Jan. 17, 2019) (authorizing the Senate Legal Counsel 
and General Counsel to the House of Representatives to “represent Congress in initiating or 
intervening in any judicial proceedings in any Federal court of competent jurisdiction on behalf 
of Congress in order to oppose any effort to suspend, terminate, or withdraw the United States 
from the North Atlantic Treaty in a manner inconsistent with this joint resolution”); see also 
Hathaway, supra note 118, at 87 (discussing the litigating authority of the House and Senate 
Offices of General Counsel). Litigation by one or both houses of Congress that brings to courts’ 
attention prior opposition—especially majoritarian opposition—to presidential action may be 
more persuasive than congressional opposition that is voiced for the first time in a litigation brief. 
Cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (explaining that the Court will 
not afford deference to agency views expressed for the first time in litigation). 
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A. War Powers 
The allocation of war powers between the president and Congress 
is one of the most hotly contested areas of constitutional law,186 and it 
is one where the Youngstown canon can add value. The Constitution 
confers war-related authorities on both Congress and the president. 
Article I grants Congress the powers, among other things, “[t]o declare 
War,” “[t]o raise and support Armies,” “[t]o provide and maintain a 
Navy,” and “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of 
the land and naval Forces.”187 Article II, on the other hand, makes the 
president the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States.”188 As Jackson noted, “[t]hese cryptic words have given 
rise to some of the most persistent controversies in our constitutional 
history.”189 Indeed, “just what authority goes with the name 
[Commander-in-Chief] has plagued presidential advisers who would 
not waive or narrow it by nonassertion yet cannot say where it begins 
or ends.”190 Presidents have long claimed a core—often a large one—
of exclusive executive authority over war powers that is not subject to 
congressional regulation.  
Congress has only rarely attempted to rein in executive war 
powers. Its “boldest attempt” is the WPR.191 Passed in 1973 in the 
aftermath of the Vietnam War and over President Richard Nixon’s 
veto, the WPR includes reporting requirements when the president 
introduces U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances” and where U.S. armed forces are deployed abroad 
while “equipped for combat.”192 It also includes provisions related to 
 
 186. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 15, at 97 (“The division of authority [over war powers] 
between the President and Congress is the most controversial and intractable issue in the 
constitutional law of U.S. foreign relations.”); Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and 
Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667, 1678 (2003) (“The meaning and scope of . . . [the 
declare war power] is contested, especially in modern times when presidents have asserted 
independent war powers more aggressively.”). 
 187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–14. 
 188. Id. art. II, § 2.  
 189. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 641 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 190. Id.  
 191. CURTIS A. BRADLEY, ASHLEY S. DEEKS & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 689 (7th ed. 2020).  
 192. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 4(a), 87 Stat. 555, 555–56 (1973) (codified 
as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (2018)).  
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congressional action. Most prominently, it includes a requirement that 
within sixty days of the introduction of forces into hostilities, the 
president shall terminate the use of such forces unless Congress has 
declared war, authorized the use of such forces, extended the deadline, 
or cannot meet due to an armed attack on the United States.193 In 
addition to the specified deadline, however, the WPR specifies that 
“any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities 
outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories 
without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such 
forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by 
concurrent resolution.”194  
Because concurrent resolutions are not subject to presentment, 
Chadha appears to invalidate this mechanism that Congress intended 
to use to restrain presidential uses of force.195 After Chadha, Congress 
enacted a statute providing a separate procedure to “force a vote to 
order the withdrawal of troops.”196 The amended process uses a joint 
resolution and so is subject to presentment and to presidential veto.197 
Congress has rarely invoked the WPR, but it twice attempted to 
require Trump to terminate hostilities.198 Congress’s first attempt came 
in spring 2019, when both houses passed a joint resolution directing 
 
 193. Id. § 5(b), 87 Stat. at 556.  
 194. Id. § 5(c), 87 Stat. at 556–57. 
 195. See, e.g., BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 191, at 693 (“Most scholars believe that such a 
concurrent resolution, if not presented to the President for signature and possible veto, is invalid 
under INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).”); MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42699, 
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 7–8 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
natsec/R42699.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8FR-YKKY] (discussing the concurrent resolution 
provision and the effect of Chadha); see also id. at 66 (noting proposals to amend the WPR to 
eliminate the concurrent resolution provision because of arguments that it is invalid after 
Chadha).  
 196. FISHER, supra note 139, at 2; see 50 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (providing an expedited procedure 
for congressional consideration of joint resolutions directing the removal of U.S. forces from 
hostilities). 
 197. For an explanation of the differences between bills and joint, concurrent, and simple 
resolutions, see Types of Legislation, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/
briefing/leg_laws_acts.htm [https://perma.cc/S6JN-KT3U]. 
 198. Another recent attempt failed to pass the House. In 2015, representatives introduced a 
concurrent resolution pursuant to the WPR that would have directed the Obama administration 
to withdraw U.S. forces deployed to fight the Islamic State. See MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., R43760, A NEW AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE 
ISLAMIC STATE: ISSUES AND CURRENT PROPOSALS 8 (2017), https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/R/R43760/16 [https://perma.cc/6SBS-5VXE] (discussing H. Con. Res. 55). The House 
Foreign Affairs Committee approved the resolution, but it failed to pass the House. Id.  
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“the President to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities 
in or affecting the Republic of Yemen” within thirty days of the 
resolution’s enactment.199 The resolution specified that the relevant 
“hostilities” included “in-flight refueling of non-United States aircraft 
conducting missions as part of the ongoing civil war in Yemen.”200 And 
it explicitly excepted U.S. armed forces “engaged in operations 
directed at al Qaeda or associated forces.”201  
Trump vetoed the resolution.202 In his veto message, Trump first 
disputed the premise that there were hostilities to be terminated, 
arguing the resolution was “unnecessary because, apart from 
counterterrorism operations against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula and ISIS, the United States is not engaged in hostilities in or 
affecting Yemen.”203 He then turned to constitutional claims. He called 
the resolution “dangerous” and argued that “Congress should not seek 
to prohibit certain tactical operations, such as in-flight refueling, or 
require military engagements to adhere to arbitrary timelines” because 
“[d]oing so would interfere with the President’s constitutional 
authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.”204 The 
constitutional claim echoed the Statement of Administration Policy 
issued prior to the resolution’s passage.205 There, the administration 
argued, “[b]ecause the President has directed United States forces to 
support the Saudi-led coalition under his constitutional powers, the 
joint resolution would raise serious constitutional concerns to the 
 
 199. S.J. Res. 7, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019); see Catie Edmondson, Senate Votes Again To End 
Aid to Saudi War in Yemen, Defying Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), https://nyti.ms/
2TByCgB [https://perma.cc/9LHC-5HTB] (discussing the Senate vote as “rebuk[ing] President 
Trump for his continued defense of Saudi Arabia after the killing of dissident journalist Jamal 
Khashoggi”); Catie Edmondson, U.S. Role in Yemen War Will End Unless Trump Issues Second 
Veto, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2WMyUOu [https://perma.cc/2UFD-YDK5] 
(discussing the House’s passage of the resolution). 
 200. S.J. Res. 7, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019). 
 201. Id.  
 202. Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval Legislation Regarding the Removal 
of United States Armed Forces from Hostilities in Yemen, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 
(Apr. 16, 2019). 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id.  
 205. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATION POLICY S.J. RES. 7 – DIRECTING THE PRESIDENT TO REMOVE UNITED 
STATES ARMED FORCES FROM HOSTILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN THAT HAVE NOT 
BEEN AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2019/03/sapsj7s_20190313.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBH6-DMLQ] [hereinafter YEMEN SAP]. See 
generally supra note 105 (discussing SAPs).  
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extent that it seeks to override the President’s determination as 
Commander in Chief.”206 Congress failed to override the veto.207 
Congress’s next attempt to rein in the Trump administration’s use 
of war powers occurred in spring 2020. Amidst escalating tensions with 
Iran, the Trump administration launched a drone strike to kill Iranian 
Major General Qassem Soleimani at the Baghdad airport.208 As legal 
authority, the executive invoked the 2002 Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force (“AUMF”) against Iraq.209 Commentators and 
congressmen pushed back, arguing, based in part on the Trump 
administration’s own prior statements, that the 2002 AUMF on Iraq 
does not authorize the use of force against Iran.210 Congress then 
passed a joint resolution explicitly stating that neither the 2001 AUMF 
passed in response to the 9/11 attacks nor the 2002 AUMF authorizes 
 
 206. YEMEN SAP, supra note 205 (addressing S.J. Res. 7).  
 207. See Roll Call Vote 116th Congress—1st Session, U.S. SENATE (2019), https://www.senate.gov/
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=116&session=1&vote=00094 [https://
perma.cc/KAH8-87DL] (showing fifty-three votes in favor of overriding the veto of S.J. Res. 7, and 
forty-five votes against, with two senators not voting).  
 208. See Michael Crowley, Falih Hassan & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim 
Suleimani, Commander of Iranian Forces, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2020), https://nyti.ms/36iPzyp 
[https://perma.cc/NR29-JEAJ] (describing the strike).  
 209. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NOTICE ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS 
GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY 
OPERATIONS 1–2 (2020), https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/4/3/4362ca46-3a7d-43e8-
a3ec-be0245705722/6E1A0F30F9204E380A7AD0C84EC572EC.doc148.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2FVJ-DF56] (citing the 2002 Iraq AUMF as authorization for the Soleimani strike and arguing 
“[t]he airstrike against Soleimani in Iraq is consistent with this longstanding interpretation of the 
President’s authority under Article II [of the Constitution] and the 2002 AUMF”); see also Jean 
Galbraith, U.S. Drone Strike in Iraq Kills Iranian Military Leader Qasem Soleimani, 114 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 313, 318–20 (2020) (providing an overview of the Trump administration’s arguments 
about its domestic legal authority for the Soleimani strike). 
 210. See, e.g., Catie Edmondson, Mike Lee, a G.O.P. Senator, Calls Administration’s Iran 
Briefing ‘Insulting,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2FzJa6p [https://perma.cc/7XFG-
2JZZ] (reporting Senator Mike Lee’s pointed criticism of a Trump administration briefing on the 
Soleimani strike); Ryan Goodman & Steve Vladeck, Why the 2002 AUMF Does Not Apply to 
Iran, JUST SEC. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/67993/why-the-2002-aumf-does-not-
apply-to-iran [https://perma.cc/M4PF-AQNH] (citing prior statements by the Trump 
administration recognizing that the 2002 AUMF does not authorize force against Iran and calling 
it “beyond any reasonable interpretation” of the 2002 AUMF “that it applies to uses of force 
against Iran in Iraq”); Ryan Goodman, White House ‘1264 Notice’ and Novel Legal Claims for 
Military Action Against Iran, JUST SEC. (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68594/white-
house-1264-notice-and-novel-legal-claims-for-military-action-against-iran [https://perma.cc/
6XDN-FLKQ] (calling the Trump administration’s claim in its notice to Congress that the 2002 
AUMF authorizes the use of force against Iran “astonishing” and “highly flawed”).  
EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2021  9:06 PM 
1290  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1245 
the use of force against Iran.211 The joint resolution further directed the 
president to terminate “hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran 
or any part of its government or military, unless explicitly authorized 
by a declaration of war or specific authorization for use of military 
force against Iran.”212 Trump vetoed the resolution.213 His veto message 
argued both that the resolution was “unnecessary” because “the 
United States is not engaged in the use of force against Iran,” and that 
the Soleimani strike “was fully authorized under both the [2002 
AUMF] . . . and the President’s constitutional authorities as 
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.”214  
For Congress, voting against an ongoing presidential use of force 
usually presents difficulties. There may be domestic political costs to 
being perceived as voting against deployed troops. Individual members 
have little incentive to defend the prerogatives of Congress as an 
institution, causing collective action problems in the war powers arena, 
just as in other areas where the separation of powers is at issue.215 For 
these and other reasons, congressional votes—especially successful 
majority votes of both houses—to terminate hostilities and withdraw 
 
 211. S.J. Res. 68, 116th Cong. § 1(3) (2020) (“The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 
Force . . . against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attack and the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 . . . do not serve as a specific statutory authorization for 
the use of force against Iran.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Authorization for Use of 
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 
note (2018)) (authorizing the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons”); Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-243, § 3(a), 116 Stat. 1498 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note) (authorizing the president “to 
use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in 
order to—(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed 
by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq”). 
 212. S.J. Res. 68, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2020). 
 213. Iran Veto, supra note 3. Notably, the White House’s SAP on S.J. Res. 68 did not indicate 
that the president would veto the joint resolution, but instead only that “his advisors would 
recommend that he veto the joint resolution.” OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE 
PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY S.J. RES. 68 – A JOINT RESOLUTION TO 
DIRECT THE REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN THAT HAVE NOT BEEN AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS 2 (Mar. 10, 
2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/SAP_S.J.-RES.-68.pdf [https://
perma.cc/762G-DTV6] (emphasis omitted). This language reflects the weaker and more 
uncertain version of a veto threat. See supra note 105 (discussing different levels of certainty in 
SAP veto threat language). 
 214. Iran Veto, supra note 3.  
 215. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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U.S. troops are likely to be rare. But what happens when they do 
occur? If the president vetoes a bill or joint resolution terminating 
hostilities, is congressional opposition irrelevant? The Youngstown 
canon suggests no.  
Use of the canon in the Yemen and Iran resolution situations is 
triggered by the majority vote of Congress, blocked by a presidential 
veto, coupled with underlying ambiguity in the scope of the president’s 
war powers.216 In practice, application of the canon would mean that 
the president’s authority to act—whether constitutional or statutory—
should be narrowly construed because of congressional opposition. 
This might manifest as a narrowing of the type of actions the executive 
could undertake, limiting executive actions to those clearly within 
exclusive executive authority, such as defense assistance. Such might 
be the case with respect to Yemen. Alternatively, applying the canon 
could mean a temporal, geographic, or substantive limit on the 
permissible targets for force. In the Iran case, as in many others over 
the past two decades, presidents have cited the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs 
and faced criticism for stretching the bounds of these statutory 
authorizations.217 In a case like the strike against Soleimani, where a 
president cites one of these statutory authorizations and Congress 
 
 216. Notably, the conditions for the canon’s application would not be met in circumstances 
where the president has exclusive authority, not subject to regulation by Congress. The scope of 
this category is debated, but it at least includes military action in self-defense. See, e.g., HENKIN, 
supra note 15, at 47 (“In response to an attack upon the United States, the President has 
constitutional authority to defend the United States.”). 
 217. In particular, the executive branch faced pushback for citing the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs 
to justify the use of force against the Islamic State. See, e.g., Tess Bridgeman, Now Is the Time To 
Repeal the 2002 AUMF, JUST SEC. (July 11, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64885/now-is-the-
time-to-repeal-the-2002-aumf [https://perma.cc/PDS5-YQ4U] (arguing that Congress should 
repeal the 2002 AUMF for several reasons, including that it is open to abuse via excessive 
executive interpretations, such as suggestions by the Trump administration that it might 
“authorize war with Iran”); Ryan Goodman, Sec. Kerry’s Difficult Defense of 2001 AUMF 
Application to ISIL—And Senators’ Disbelief, JUST SEC. (Sept. 17, 2014), https://
www.justsecurity.org/15152/sec-kerrys-defense-2001-aumf-applies-isil-senators-disbelief [https://
perma.cc/VMS6-QYCN] (detailing congressional testimony by then-Secretary of State John 
Kerry about the 2001 AUMF as the legal basis for the use of force against the Islamic State and 
incredulity expressed by senators); Charlie Savage, Obama Sees Iraq Resolution as a Legal Basis 
for Airstrikes, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1qQK14n [https://
perma.cc/7B8B-26CF] (reporting that the Obama administration viewed the 2002 AUMF as an 
alternative legal basis—in addition to the 2001 AUMF—for the use of force against the Islamic 
State). For an overview of how the executive branch has cited the 2001 AUMF as authority for 
action, see generally, MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43983, 2001 AUTHORIZATION 
FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE: ISSUES CONCERNING ITS CONTINUED APPLICATION (2015), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43983.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T5U-SWPX]. 
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objects, the Youngstown canon instructs that courts, executive branch 
lawyers, and other interpreters should narrowly construe the AUMF 
in light of later, specific congressional opposition to interpreting it to 
reach the use of force against Iran.218  
As a normative matter, the use of the canon in war powers–related 
situations follows from several of the grounds discussed above.219 War 
powers is an area of shared constitutional responsibility where the 
Framers, by dividing authority between the executive and the 
legislature, intended the branches to act as mutual checks and 
constraints. The Youngstown canon helps preserve this intent by 
hampering presidents’ ability to stretch broad, ambiguous 
congressional authorizations beyond their intended scope, while at the 
same time using the veto to block congressional attempts to adjust or 
repeal existing authorizations. The canon functions similarly in cases 
where the president acts without any claimed congressional 
authorization; there, the ambiguous powers being narrowly construed 
would be constitutional ones.  
Application of the Youngstown canon with respect to joint 
resolutions related to the WPR might be further justified as addressing 
bargains upset by Chadha. The WPR contemplated that Congress 
could force the president to cease hostilities with a concurrent 
resolution, which entails a majority vote of both houses and is not 
subject to a veto.220 At times, the Department of Justice’s OLC has 
treated the WPR—intended by Congress as a restraint on presidential 
war powers—as effectively an authorization to the president or 
recognition of the president’s authority to engage in short-term 
hostilities without congressional approval.221 In its 2011 opinion on U.S. 
involvement in Libya, OLC argued that in the WPR, “Congress . . . 
implicitly recognized” presidential authority to enter into hostilities for 
 
 218. This is a second-best solution to having clear, precisely tailored AUMFs in the first place. 
 219. See supra Part I.C. 
 220. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 221. See BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 191, at 690 (explaining that the executive has construed 
§ 5 of the WPR to “in effect authorize the President to engage in short-term military conflicts 
without congressional authorization” and citing OLC opinions on Haiti and Libya). OLC cites 
the WPR provision requiring the president to terminate hostilities within sixty days unless 
Congress declares war, authorizes use of the armed forces, extends the deadline, or cannot meet 
as a result of an armed attack. See Deployment of U.S. Armed Forced into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 
173, 175 (1994) (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1994)). OLC has argued that, “This structure makes 
sense only if the President may introduce troops into hostilities or potential hostilities without 
prior authorization by the Congress . . . .” Id. at 175–76.  
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periods shorter than sixty days without congressional authorization,222 
and that “[b]y allowing United States involvement in hostilities to 
continue for 60 or 90 days, Congress signaled in the WPR that it 
considers congressional authorization most critical for ‘major, 
prolonged conflicts such as the wars in Vietnam and Korea,’ not more 
limited engagements.”223  
Taking this highly questionable interpretation of the WPR on its 
own terms renders the WPR another example of statutory delegations 
disrupted by Chadha. In the WPR, Congress did not recognize the 
president’s authority or authorize the president to engage in hostilities 
without congressional approval; rather, it set a default rule that such 
hostilities must automatically terminate unless a specified exception 
applies or Congress passes a concurrent resolution requiring their 
termination at an earlier time. OLC’s interpretation of the WPR as a 
congressional concession fails to take into account that if Congress 
intended to make such a concession or recognition at all, it did so only 
on the understanding that it could police presidential uses of force 
through concurrent resolutions not subject to presidential veto. 
Chadha, of course, eliminated that possibility. But OLC has continued 
to cite the potentially empowering portion of the WPR while ignoring 
the manner in which Congress intended the WPR to function.  
Following on the last point, it may be especially ironic, but also 
important, to note that the main locus for interpretation of the WPR 
and AUMFs is the executive branch.224 Courts generally do not 
adjudicate questions of war powers due to problems with, for example, 
standing, ripeness, and the political question doctrine.225 To be sure, 
 
 222. Auth. To Use Mil. Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. slip op. at 8 (Apr. 1, 2011).  
 223. Id. at 8–9 (quoting Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti, supra note 221, at 176). 
 224. This situation may be particularly ironic with respect to the WPR, which Congress 
enacted over a presidential veto. Cf. McNollgast, supra note 116, at 720 (“[I]f the President vetoed 
the legislation, and both houses voted to override his veto, then the President’s preferences [in 
interpreting the legislation] can be accorded no weight.”). 
 225. See, e.g., Bin Ali Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (dismissing as 
a political question a lawsuit challenging the legality of a U.S. drone strike in Yemen); Doe v. 
Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134–35 (1st Cir. 2003) (dismissing suit by military members and congressmen 
seeking an injunction against Iraq War on the grounds that the case was not ripe); Campbell v. 
Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (dismissing for lack of standing a challenge by 
congressmen to U.S. participation in NATO forces’ actions in Yugoslavia). But see Hathaway, 
supra note 118, at 93 (arguing that “one or both houses of Congress could challenge an act by the 
executive branch that has concrete and particular injuries to their respective powers” or pass a 
resolution to “authorize a congressional committee to sue for the same purpose,” and making the 
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executive branch officials have a client—the president—but they have 
also sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, and they, just as much as courts, can use the Youngstown canon 
when construing the Constitution and war powers–related statutes.226 
B. Statutory Delegations Locked in by Chadha 
The WPR was only one way that Congress tried to reclaim power 
and exert oversight over the executive in the wake of the Vietnam War. 
Another statute of the same vintage came to prominence in 2019 when 
Trump declared a national emergency relating to the southern border 
of the United States in an attempt to divert money to build a border 
wall that Congress had declined to fund.227 The declaration put a 
spotlight on the 1976 NEA, another statute that Congress designed to 
rein in the president via use of concurrent resolutions. After Chadha, 
congressional terminations of national emergencies can proceed only 
through joint resolutions, which are subject to presidential veto. 
Congress’s attempt to terminate Trump’s declaration of an emergency 
at the southern border prompted the first veto of Trump’s presidency 
and a wave of litigation.228  
This Section highlights the NEA as an example of statutory 
schemes disrupted by Chadha.229 It discusses the history and structure 
of the NEA, provides an overview of the disputes over the southern-
border declaration, and describes how the Youngstown canon may be 
relevant to ongoing or future litigation about the use of emergency 
powers pursuant to the NEA.  
From the 1950s through the early 1970s, congressional concerns 
grew about presidents’ continuation of national emergencies and 
associated extraordinary exercises of power long after the events that 
prompted the initial emergency declarations.230 By 1973 when a special 
 
further point that “[a] similar technique” could be used to overcome the political question 
doctrine). 
 226. See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text (discussing use of canons by the executive 
branch). 
 227. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a 
Constitutional Clash, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2V2h1dT [https://perma.cc/
M4JX-L8D4].  
 228. See infra notes 249–55 and accompanying text. 
 229. For sources on other statutory schemes disrupted by Chadha, see supra note 139. 
 230. For an overview of the background of the National Emergencies Act (“NEA”), see L. 
ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RES. SERV., RL98505, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 8 (2020), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/98-505.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN7L-QL98]. 
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congressional committee began investigating emergency powers, it 
considered declarations issued in 1933, 1950, 1970, and 1971—all of 
which were still in effect.231 In 1976, Congress passed and President 
Gerald Ford signed the NEA.232 The statute dealt with existing national 
emergencies by effectively requiring a new presidential emergency 
declaration for continued use of the underlying emergency powers.233 
It also “established an exclusive means for declaring a national 
emergency” going forward, specifying that such declarations would 
automatically expire after one year unless terminated by the president 
or Congress or extended by the president.234  
In the floor debate over the NEA, Senator Frank Church, who 
cochaired the Senate committee that drafted the bill,235 invoked 
Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence.236 Church noted:  
[O]ur legislation will constitute the exclusive authority for the 
exercise of Presidential powers in an emergency. The Congress 
having acted, the President’s power will be, in Justice Jackson’s 
words, “at its lowest ebb.” In the future, every type and class of 
presidentially declared emergency will be subject to congressional 
control.237  
He explained that “nothing in this bill would interfere with the 
President’s right to declare a national emergency in the future or 
deprive him of the necessary power to cope with such an 
emergency.”238 Rather, the underlying statutes granting the president 
“emergency powers remain on the shelf, to be pulled off and used as 
may be required in order to deal with some future crisis.”239 However, 
he continued, “the procedures governing the use of emergency powers 
in the future will always be subject to congressional review and any 
declaration of an emergency may be terminated by a concurrent 
 
 231. Id. at 7. 
 232. National Emergencies Act, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–51 (2018)). 
 233. See HALCHIN, supra note 230, at 10 (describing the NEA); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1601 
(addressing “Termination of Existing Declared Emergencies”). 
 234. HALCHIN, supra note 230, at 11; see also 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621–22, 1631 (addressing 
processes for declaration and termination of national emergencies). For a list of all emergencies 
declared pursuant to the NEA, see HALCHIN, supra note 230, at 11–16. 
 235. HALCHIN, supra note 230, at 7. 
 236. 122 CONG. REC. 28,227 (1976) (statement of Sen. Frank Church). 
 237. Id.  
 238. Id.  
 239. Id. 
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resolution of the Congress,” leaving Congress “in a position to assert 
its ultimate authority.”240  
This envisioned structure, however, was not to be. Chadha 
effectively rendered this process invalid. In 1985, in Chadha’s wake, 
Congress amended the NEA to replace the concurrent resolution 
provision with one requiring a joint resolution for terminating national 
emergencies.241  
The Trump administration’s use of the NEA showed just how 
consequential this shift was. Trump’s declaration of a national 
emergency related to the southern U.S. border followed months of 
dispute with Congress about funding construction of the border wall. 
The impasse between the branches over Congress’s refusal to 
appropriate $5.7 billion that Trump had requested for border wall 
construction sparked a monthlong government shutdown from 
December 2018 into January 2019.242 In February 2019, Congress 
passed and the president signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
FY2019, which provided only $1.375 billion “for the construction of 
primary pedestrian fencing . . . in the Rio Grande Valley Sector.”243 The 
same day he signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Trump 
issued a proclamation “declar[ing] that a national emergency exists at 
 
 240. Id.  
 241. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, § 801, 99 Stat. 405, 448 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (2018)). Compare National Emergencies Act, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1602) (“(a) Any national emergency declared by the President in 
accordance with this title shall terminate if—(1) Congress terminates the emergency by 
concurrent resolution; or (2) the President issues a proclamation terminating the emergency.”), 
with 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (“Any national emergency declared by the President in accordance with 
this subchapter shall terminate if—(1) there is enacted into law a joint resolution terminating the 
emergency; or (2) the President issues a proclamation terminating the emergency.”).  
 242. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Emily Cochrane, Government Shuts Down as Talks Fail To 
Break Impasse, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2GzEfWo [https://perma.cc/2QVU-
GB27] (explaining that the shutdown began “after congressional and White House officials failed 
to find a compromise on a spending bill that hinged on President Trump’s demands for $5.7 billion 
for a border wall”); Nicholas Fandos, Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Peter Baker, Trump Signs Bill 
Reopening Government for 3 Weeks in Surprise Retreat from Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://nyti.ms/2S2Wx6Y [https://perma.cc/AZV8-MMTT] (explaining that the government 
shutdown ended with a stopgap spending bill allowing the government to reopen while 
negotiations continued between Congress and the executive over border wall funding). 
 243. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, div. A, § 230(a)(1), 133 Stat. 
13, 28; see also id. div. D, § 739, 133 Stat. at 82 (prohibiting the use of appropriated funds “to 
increase, eliminate, or reduce funding for a program, project, or activity as proposed in the 
President’s budget request” unless “such proposed change is subsequently enacted in an 
appropriation Act, or . . . made pursuant to the reprogramming or transfer provisions of this or 
any other appropriations Act”).  
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the southern border of the United States,”244 citing the border as “a 
major entry point for criminals, gang members, and illicit narcotics” 
and a “problem of large-scale unlawful migration.”245 The 
proclamation declared that the “emergency requires use of the Armed 
Forces” and invoked, among other things, authority provided by 10 
U.S.C. § 2808,246 which in turn allows the secretary of defense to 
“undertake military construction projects . . . not otherwise authorized 
by law that are necessary to support such use of the armed forces.”247 
The White House asserted that the proclamation made available $3.6 
billion from military construction funds pursuant to § 2808, plus 
additional funds from other sources, for a total of $8.1 billion available 
for border-wall construction.248  
Congress responded by passing a joint resolution pursuant to the 
NEA declaring the national emergency to be terminated.249 Trump, 
predictably, vetoed the resolution,250 as well as a subsequent resolution 
along the same lines.251  
 
 244. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 20, 2019).  
 245. Id.  
 246. Id.  
 247. 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a) (2018). The section further specifies, “Such projects may be 
undertaken only within the total amount of funds that have been appropriated for military 
construction, including funds appropriated for family housing, that have not been obligated.” Id.  
 248. Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump’s Border Security Victory, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 
15, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-border-
security-victory [https://perma.cc/J8DS-N2GY].  
 249. H.R.J. Res. 46, 116th Cong. (2019). The NEA provides for expedited procedures of 
legislative consideration of joint resolutions terminating emergencies, and these provisions 
remained in effect after the shift from concurrent to joint resolutions. See HALCHIN, supra note 
230, at 19–20. 
 250. Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval Legislation To 
Terminate the National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States, 2019 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Mar. 15, 2019) (calling H.J. Res. 46 “a dangerous resolution that 
would undermine United States sovereignty and threaten the lives and safety of countless 
Americans”). 
 251. A Joint Resolution Relating to a National Emergency Declared by the President on 
February 15, 2019, S.J. Res. 54, 116th Cong. (2019); Message Returning Without Approval 
Legislation To Terminate the National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the 
United States, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Oct. 15, 2019) (asserting that “the situation on 
our southern border remains a national emergency, and our Armed Forces are still needed to 
help confront it”). The NEA requires Congress to consider a joint resolution to terminate a 
national emergency every six months. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b) (2018) (“Not later than six months after 
a national emergency is declared, and not later than the end of each six-month period thereafter 
that such emergency continues, each House of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a joint 
resolution to determine whether that emergency shall be terminated.”).  
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The emergency proclamation and repurposing of funds for border 
wall construction prompted a number of lawsuits.252 The cases raise 
multiple questions of statutory interpretation, including, for example, 
whether there is a national emergency that “requires the use of the 
armed forces,”253 whether transfer of funds previously appropriated for 
other purposes to border wall construction is “based on unforeseen 
military requirements,”254 whether border wall construction projects 
constitute “military construction projects,” and, if so, whether they are 
“necessary to support [the] use of the armed forces.”255  
Along with other principles of statutory construction, the 
Youngstown canon can assist in resolving these or similar interpretive 
questions that might arise. To the extent that there is ambiguity about 
the existence or scope of the president’s authority, the Youngstown 
canon’s triggering conditions are met: Congress has attempted—
multiple times—to terminate the national emergency, but has been 
thwarted by presidential vetoes. The Youngstown canon therefore 
counsels in favor of narrowly construing the scope of presidential 
authority. In particular cases, this could mean narrowly construing, for 
example, the meaning of “national emergency,” which is undefined in 
 
 252. See, e.g., California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 950 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub. nom. 
Trump v. Sierra Club, No. 20-138, 2020 WL 6121565 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2020) (holding that the transfer 
of funds for construction of the border wall was unlawful); Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 874, 
886–87 (9th Cir. 2020) (same), cert. granted, No. 20-138, 2020 WL 6121565 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2020); 
El Paso Cnty. v. Trump, 982 F.3d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that El Paso County and the 
Border Network for Human Rights lack standing to challenge use of funds for border wall 
construction); U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (petition 
for rehearing en banc pending). 
 253. See, e.g., Brief of the U.S. House of Representatives at 47–48, Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1 (No. 
19-5176) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a) (2018)).  
 254. Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education 
Appropriations Act of 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, 
§ 8005, 132 Stat. 2981, 2999 (2018); see, e.g., California v. Trump, 963 F.3d at 944–48 (holding that 
construction of the border wall was neither “unforeseen” nor related to a “military 
requirement”). 
 255. 10 U.S.C. § 2808; see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853, 879 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding 
that § 2808 does not authorize the border wall construction projects because “they are neither 
necessary to support the use of the armed forces, nor are they military construction projects”).  
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the NEA,256 or terms in underlying emergency powers statutes, such as 
“military construction project[].”257  
The Ninth Circuit did just that in Sierra Club v. Trump.258 Citing 
this Article, the court rejected the Trump administration’s claim that 
§ 2808 authorizes border wall construction.259 The court did not identify 
ambiguity in the statutory language, but nonetheless explained that 
“[p]articularly . . . where Congress declined to fund the very projects at 
issue and attempted to terminate the declaration of a national 
emergency (twice), we cannot interpret the statute to give the 
Executive Branch unfettered discretion to divert funds to any land it 
deems under military jurisdiction.”260 The court reasoned that “[h]ere, 
though imperfectly, Congress has made clear that it does not support 
extensive border wall construction . . . and therefore, the existing 
 
 256. See Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court’s Contribution to the Confrontation over 
Emergency Powers, LAWFARE (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-courts-
contribution-confrontation-over-emergency-powers [https://perma.cc/QQL9-HFCZ] (noting 
that when Congress passed the NEA with a concurrent resolution provision for terminating 
national emergencies, “[a]ttempting to define ‘emergencies’ in advance was . . . not as pressing a 
concern, because Congress could decide, after a presidential declaration of emergency, whether 
it agreed”); cf. Ilya Somin, Why Trump’s Emergency Declaration Is Illegal, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Feb. 23, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://reason.com/2019/02/23/why-trumps-emergency-declaration-is-
ille [https://perma.cc/3TCZ-3NSS] (arguing that the ordinary meaning of “emergency” should 
constrain the president’s discretion in declaring an emergency). 
 257. 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a). 
 258. Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 259. Id. at 887 n.12.  
 260. Id. at 887. The court made a similar point in rejecting the Trump administration’s 
proposed interpretation of “necessary” in § 2808. See id. at 881 (“That Congress declined to 
provide more substantial funding for border wall construction and voted twice to terminate the 
President’s declaration of a national emergency underscores that the border wall is not, in fact, 
required or needed.”). The same panel also referenced the vetoed joint resolution in an earlier 
opinion, holding that the Department of Defense lacked authority to transfer previously 
appropriated funds for use in border wall construction because Congress had authorized such 
transfers “only in response to an ‘unforeseen military requirement.’” California v. Trump, 963 
F.3d 946, 944 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub. nom. Trump v. Sierra Club, No. 20-138, 2020 WL 
6121565 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2020) (quoting Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2019, Pub. 
L. No. 115-245, § 8005, 132 Stat. 2981, 2999 (2018)). In construing “unforeseen,” the court noted, 
“Congress’s joint resolution terminating the President’s declaration of a national emergency only 
reinforces this point: there was no unanticipated crisis at the border.” Id. at 945. The majority’s 
reference to the vetoed joint resolution prompted an objection from the dissent. See id. at 973 
n.23 (Collins, J., dissenting) (“Congress’s joint resolutions attempting to terminate the emergency 
declaration are irrelevant for the further reason that they were vetoed and never became law.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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statutory authority provided by Section 2808 must be construed 
narrowly.”261  
The canon could also interact with executive claims that its actions 
are authorized by Congress and that they therefore fall within 
Youngstown Category One.262 To the extent that tools of statutory 
interpretation, including the Youngstown canon, suggest that the 
president’s actions do not fall within the scope of activities authorized 
by the NEA or underlying emergency powers statutes, courts should 
conclude that the president is in Youngstown Category Two—the zone 
of twilight—or even Category Three—where his power is at its lowest 
ebb. Pushing back on the scope of congressional authorizations and 
shifting out of Youngstown Category One eliminates the executive’s 
reliance on “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of 
judicial interpretation” that attend Category One actions.263 
The NEA is a good case for considering congressional opposition 
blocked by vetoes because of Chadha’s disruptive effect. Chadha 
essentially created a one-way ratchet: Congress left prior delegations 
of emergency powers on the books when it passed the NEA because it 
believed it could claw back such delegations with concurrent 
resolutions as needed.264 But Chadha rendered that plan impossible. 
Now, the only way to pull back emergency powers is with presidential 
agreement or a supermajority of Congress.265 In the meantime, the 
Youngstown canon provides a way to give bicameral attempts to rein 
in presidential excesses some interpretive effect, without running afoul 
of Chadha.  
 
 261. Sierra Club, 977 F.3d at 887. 
 262. See, e.g., Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 27–
28, Sierra Club v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-00892) (arguing that 
the president’s actions were authorized by Congress and therefore fell within Youngstown 
Category One).  
 263. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 637 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 264. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (quoting Sen. Frank Church). 
 265. For an overview of proposals to reform presidential emergency powers, including NEA 
reform proposals that have garnered bipartisan support, see Elizabeth Goitein, Good Governance 
Paper No. 18: Reforming Emergency Powers, JUST SEC. (Oct. 31, 2020), https://
www.justsecurity.org/73196/good-governance-paper-no-18-emergency-powers [https://perma.cc/
SL6J-6J74].  
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C. Congressional Action to Block Treaty Terminations 
The Trump administration reinvigorated debates about another 
unsettled area of constitutional law—whether the president has 
authority to withdraw from or terminate international agreements 
unilaterally. The Trump administration withdrew or announced its 
intention to withdraw the United States from numerous international 
agreements,266 including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty,267 the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular 
Rights with Iran,268 the Paris Climate Agreement,269 the Treaty on 
 
 266. See Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential Power To Terminate International Agreements, 128 
YALE L.J. F. 432, 433–34 (2018) [hereinafter Koh, Presidential Power] (documenting agreements 
from which the Trump administration announced its withdrawal or threatened to withdraw); see 
also Harold Hongju Koh, Could the President Unilaterally Terminate All International 
Agreements?, in THE RESTATEMENT AND BEYOND: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF U.S. 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 67, 67 & n.1 (Paul B. Stephan & Sarah H. Cleveland eds., 2020) 
[hereinafter Koh, Unilaterally Terminate] (providing an updated list of agreements from which 
the Trump administration withdrew or threatened to withdraw). I use “international agreement” 
to refer to agreements that are binding between states as a matter of international law and 
“treaties” to refer to the subset of such agreements that have undergone the Article II process of 
approval by two-thirds of the Senate and ratification by the president. I use the terms 
“withdrawal” and “termination” interchangeably to refer to a U.S. exit from any international 
agreement; technically however, exit of one or both parties from a bilateral international 
agreement would “terminate” such agreement, whereas exit of one party from a multilateral 
international agreement would constitute “withdrawal” rather than “termination,” as the 
multilateral agreement would continue in force for the remaining states parties. Cf. Koh, 
Presidential Power, supra, at 435 n.8 (“When one or two partners lawfully terminate or abrogate 
a bilateral agreement, it is dead. But when one partner lawfully withdraws from, or abrogates its 
legal duties to comply with, a multilateral treaty, the agreement continues, minus that partner.”). 
 267. Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Withdrawal from the INF 
Treaty on Aug. 2, 2019 (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-inf-treaty-
on-august-2-2019 [https://perma.cc/A4CE-JBS4] (announcing that the United States provided 
notice of its intent to withdraw pursuant to the treaty). 
 268. See Edward Wong & David E. Sanger, U.S. Withdraws from 1955 Treaty Normalizing 
Relations with Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2OvJFo8 [https://perma.cc/MHC2-
BGYW] (discussing the withdrawal). On the same day, National Security Advisor John Bolton 
announced that the United States would withdraw from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. See Roberta Rampton, Lesley Wroughton & Stephanie van 
den Berg, U.S. Withdraws from International Accords, Says U.N. World Court ‘Politicized,’ 
REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-diplomacy-treaty/u-s-reviewing-
agreements-that-expose-it-to-world-court-bolton-idUSKCN1MD2CP [https://perma.cc/KP7L-
CFUE] (discussing the announcement). 
 269. Media Note, Off. of the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, Communication Regarding 
Intent To Withdraw from Paris Agreement (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.state.gov/communication-
regarding-intent-to-withdraw-from-paris-agreement [https://perma.cc/JTK4-BQZQ] (stating 
that the United States communicated to the United Nations its “intent to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement as soon as it is eligible to do so, consistent with the terms of the Agreement”). 
EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2021  9:06 PM 
1302  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1245 
Open Skies,270 and membership in the World Health Organization.271 
With a demonstrated willingness to terminate treaties and withdraw 
the United States from international agreements, the Trump 
administration’s periodic suggestions that it might pull the United 
States out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”)—the 
30-nation military alliance established in 1949 to counter the Soviet 
Union272—triggered particular alarm in Congress. Congressmen 
introduced several bills to prevent the president from withdrawing 
from NATO absent congressional consent. For example, Senate Joint 
Resolution Four, reported favorably by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in December 2019,273 specifies, “The President shall not 
suspend, terminate, or withdraw the United States from the North 
Atlantic Treaty, . . . except by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, provided that two thirds of the Senators present concur, or 
pursuant to an Act of Congress.”274  
 
 270. Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, On the Treaty on Open Skies 
(May 21, 2020), https://www.state.gov/on-the-treaty-on-open-skies [https://perma.cc/69QP-PB3L] 
(announcing the U.S. intent to withdraw from the treaty); see also David E. Sanger, Trump Will 
Withdraw from Open Skies Arms Control Treaty, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2020), https://nyti.ms/
3bQyePt [https://perma.cc/5HTF-9NDA] (discussing the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies 
treaty). 
 271. Katie Rogers & Apoorva Mandavilli, Trump Administration Signals Formal Withdrawal 
from W.H.O., N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2VYH5JT [https://perma.cc/JN2N-
SHGV] (reporting that the United States transmitted a “notice of withdrawal, effective July 6, 
2021” to the World Health Organization (“WHO”)). But see Harold Hongju Koh, Trump’s Empty 
“Withdrawal” from the World Health Organization, JUST SEC. (May 30, 2020) [hereinafter Koh, 
Trump’s Empty Withdrawal], https://www.justsecurity.org/70493/trumps-empty-withdrawal-
from-the-world-health-organization [https://perma.cc/AY8R-EFHN] (explaining the numerous 
hurdles or potential hurdles to actual withdrawal). 
 272. What is NATO?, NATO, https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html [https://
perma.cc/NLX8-GTZW]. 
 273. All Actions, S.J. Res. 4 — 116th Congress (2019–2020), CONGRESS.GOV [hereinafter All 
Actions, S.J. Res. 4], https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/4/all-
actions [https://perma.cc/PAU3-LVKX]. 
 274. S.J. Res. 4, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019). A somewhat similar bill—the “NATO Support Act”—
was introduced in and passed the House. H.R. 676, 116th Cong. (2019). The NATO Support Act 
expresses “the sense of Congress that . . . the President shall not withdraw the United States from 
NATO” and “Goldwater v. Carter is not controlling legal precedent,” and states that it is U.S. 
policy to “remain a member in good standing of NATO,” while also prohibiting the use of funds 
to withdraw from NATO. Id. §§ 3–5. The bill “appear[s] to be designed to prohibit the president 
from withdrawing from” NATO, though the prohibition is less clear than that in S.J. Res. 4. See 
Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Constitutional Issues Relating to the NATO Support Act, 
LAWFARE (Jan. 28, 2019, 7:43 AM) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Constitutional Issues], 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/constitutional-issues-relating-nato-support-act [https://perma.cc/
M3MU-5XAC] (discussing the differences in the bills’ provisions); see also No NATO 
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Trump’s unilateral treaty withdrawals and the putative 
congressional opposition, at least to the NATO withdrawal, implicate 
unsettled questions about the Constitution’s allocation of treaty 
termination authority. The Constitution specifies how treaties are 
made,275 but says nothing about how they may be terminated.276 The 
issue came to a head in 1978 when President Jimmy Carter acted 
unilaterally to terminate a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan as part 
of the process of recognizing the People’s Republic of China, and a 
group of senators filed suit to challenge the treaty termination.277 The 
Supreme Court failed to resolve the constitutional question in 
Goldwater v. Carter,278 delivering a set of fractured opinions, none of 
which garnered a majority.279 A four-Justice plurality opinion by 
Justice William Rehnquist considered the case to present a 
nonjusticiable political question.280 Despite the fact that it is not 
binding precedent, the Rehnquist opinion has cast a long shadow, 
causing lower courts to dismiss several subsequent attempts to 
 
Withdrawal Act, H.R. 6530, 115th Cong. (2018) (including provisions similar to the NATO 
Support Act); Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2018, S. 3336, 115th 
Cong. § 102 (2018) (prohibiting the use of appropriated funds to effectuate NATO withdrawal 
absent passage by two-thirds of the Senate of a resolution “advising and consenting to the 
withdrawal of the United States from the treaty”). The 2020 National Defense Authorization Act 
included a provision stating, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be 
obligated, expended, or otherwise made available” from the act’s passage through “December 31, 
2020, to take any action to suspend, terminate, or provide notice of denunciation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, done at Washington, D.C. on April 4, 1949.” National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1242, 133 Stat. 1198, 1656 (2019). The fact that the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee favorably reported the clearer withdrawal ban on the same 
day that the full Senate adopted the above provision of the NDAA may suggest that the 
Committee is not confident that the NDAA’s funding ban is sufficient to prohibit withdrawal. 
Compare All Actions, S.J. Res. 4, supra note 273 (showing committee passage on Dec. 17, 2019), 
with All Actions, S. 1790 — 116th Congress (2019–2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/senate-bill/1790/actions [https://perma.cc/LA32-MLWB] (showing Senate agreement to 
the conference report on Dec. 17, 2019). 
 275. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the president “shall have Power, by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur”). 
 276. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 313 cmt. b (AM. 
L. INST. 2018) (“The text of the Constitution . . . does not specify how the United States is to 
suspend, terminate, or withdraw from treaties.”); Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treaty Termination and 
the Separation of Powers, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 247, 252 (2013) [hereinafter Eichensehr, Treaty 
Termination] (discussing the Constitution’s silence on treaty termination). 
 277. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699–701 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc). 
 278. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
 279. See id. at 997.  
 280. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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challenge unilateral presidential treaty terminations as political 
questions.281  
In the absence of definitive resolution by the courts, practice has, 
unsurprisingly, shifted in favor of presidents terminating treaties 
unilaterally. Prior to the twentieth century, the practice was 
considerably more mixed.282 Presidents terminated treaties with 
authorization from Congress as a whole and sometimes from the 
Senate alone,283 and the first unilateral presidential termination did not 
occur until 1899.284 In recent decades, however, the president has 
exercised termination authority unilaterally,285 often with little 
controversy.286 This historical practice led the recent Restatement 
(Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States to conclude 
that “the President has the authority to act on behalf of the United 
States in suspending or terminating U.S. treaty commitments and in 
withdrawing the United States from treaties,” at least so long as he 
does so “either on the basis of terms in the treaty allowing for such 
 
 281. See Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2–3, 18 (D.D.C. 2002) (dismissing challenge to 
unilateral presidential withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as a nonjusticiable 
political question); Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1192–93, 1199 (D. Mass. 
1986) (dismissing a challenge to Reagan’s unilateral termination of a Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation Treaty with Nicaragua as a political question). 
 282. See Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773, 
788–801 (2014) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Termination] (providing an account of U.S. treaty 
termination practice from the founding through the early twentieth century). The Reporters’ 
Notes to the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provide a 
concise overview of congressional involvement in U.S. treaty terminations through the early 
twentieth century and the shift to unilateral presidential terminations in the twentieth century. 
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 313, reporters’ notes 2-3 
(AM. L. INST. 2018). 
 283. See TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED 
STATES SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 106-71, at 202–06 (Jan. 2001) (cataloguing examples of treaty 
terminations with prior or subsequent approval of Congress or the Senate); Bradley, Treaty 
Termination, supra note 282, at 788–96 (cataloguing examples of presidents terminating treaties 
pursuant to ex ante or occasionally ex post authorization from Congress or the Senate). 
 284. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 282, at 798–99 (dating the first unilateral 
presidential termination to the McKinley administration’s termination of “certain clauses in an 
1850 commercial treaty with Switzerland” in 1899). 
 285. See id. at 801–20 (describing the shift in the twentieth century toward unilateral 
presidential terminations); see also Jean Galbraith, Treaty Termination as Foreign Affairs 
Exceptionalism, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 121, 127–28 (2014) (highlighting the dramatic nature 
of the shift in practice and questioning whether it can thus properly be described as “historical 
gloss”). 
 286. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 313 cmt. c (AM. L. 
INST. 2018). 
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action (such as a withdrawal clause) or on the basis of international law 
that would justify such action.”287 
But recognizing the practical reality of the president’s authority to 
terminate treaties is not the same as saying that the president possesses 
an exclusive—and thus preclusive—power to terminate all treaties in 
all circumstances. Indeed, scholarly views since Goldwater have moved 
toward the idea that the question of constitutional authority over 
termination cannot be answered in general. Rather, whether the 
president may unilaterally terminate an international agreement may 
depend, for example, on whether the termination complies with 
international law,288 the manner in which the agreement was 
concluded,289 and, importantly, whether Congress has acted to restrain 
the president’s authority to terminate unilaterally.290 To date, Congress 
has not acted definitively to restrict the president’s unilateral 
 
 287. Id. § 313(1). But see Koh, Unilaterally Terminate, supra note 266, at 73 (criticizing the 
Restatement’s characterization that “established” practice supports presidential termination 
authority).  
 288. Importantly, the Restatement bakes this condition into its general rule that the president 
can unilaterally terminate international agreements, noting that the president may act to 
terminate when he does so in accordance with a treaty or other international law. See supra note 
286 and accompanying text. 
 289. See Koh, Presidential Power, supra note 266, at 435–36 (arguing that treaty termination 
“cannot be addressed by a single rule that purports to be ‘transsubstantive,’ in the sense of 
governing the mechanics of withdrawal, suspension, or termination of national participation from 
each and every international agreement addressing every subject matter” and arguing instead that 
“absent exceptional circumstances, the degree of congressional participation constitutionally 
required to exit any particular agreement should mirror the degree of congressional participation 
that was required to enter that agreement in the first place”). 
 290. See, e.g., Eichensehr, Treaty Termination, supra note 276, at 279–86 (proposing that 
Congress could impose a “for-cause” restriction on treaty termination); see also Jean 
Galbraith, The President’s Power To Withdraw the United States from International Agreements 
at Present and in the Future, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 445, 448 (2018) (“[T]he Senate could condition 
its advice and consent to a treaty on legislative approval of withdrawal or on for-cause 
justifications; Congress could do the same with respect to an ex post congressional-executive 
agreement . . . .” (footnote omitted)); infra notes 294–96 and accompanying text (discussing 
various ways Congress could limit the president’s authority to withdraw from NATO). 
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termination authority.291 Indeed, in Goldwater v. Carter,292 the D.C. 
Circuit, which upheld President Carter’s unilateral termination of the 
Mutual Defense Treaty prior to the Supreme Court’s review, 
highlighted that:  
The Senate, in the course of giving its consent, exhibited no purpose 
and took no action to reserve a role for itself—by amendment, 
reservation, or condition—in the effectuation of this provision. 
Neither has the Senate, since the giving of the notice of termination, 
purported to take any final or decisive action with respect to it, either 
by way of approval or disapproval.293  
What if Congress did act? Let’s take a restriction on NATO 
withdrawal as an example. If Congress were to pass one of the bills 
prohibiting unilateral presidential withdrawal from NATO and the bill 
were to become law, Congress would shift a president who 
subsequently withdrew from NATO from Youngstown Category Two 
to Category Three.294 In other words, if Congress enacted a prohibition 
on terminating NATO, “it would . . . substantially alter the calculus on 
whether Trump can withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty.”295 As 
Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have explained, “The 
question posed by an enacted [statute prohibiting NATO withdrawal] 
is whether the president’s power to terminate is exclusive, which would 
 
 291. Congress came close in 2019, passing a statutory provision requiring congressional 
notification at least 120 days before the United States would provide formal notice of U.S. intent 
to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty. See Jean Galbraith, United States Gives Notice of 
Withdrawal from Treaty on Open Skies, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 779, 782–83 (2020) (describing and 
citing the statutory provision, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. 
No. 116-92, § 1234, 133 Stat. 1198 (2019)). The Trump administration disregarded the notice 
requirement, id. at 783, and the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty became final in November 2020, 
see Paulina Firozi, Trump Administration Exits Open Skies Treaty, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/11/22/trump-administration-exits-open-
skies-treaty [https://perma.cc/QL2B-NMVJ]. 
 292. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 293. Id. at 699.  
 294. In a recent article, Professor Harold Hongju Koh notes the possibilities of Congress 
enacting “general laws prospectively limiting the President’s discretion to unilaterally terminate 
all Article II treaties and congressional agreements” or “adopt[ing] specific statutes limiting . . . 
executive discretion with respect to particularly important named treaties” and argues that 
“[e]ither kind of legislative enactment would place any such unilateral termination into 
Youngstown Category Three.” Koh, Presidential Power, supra note 266, at 479. Koh also notes in 
the alternative that “the Senate could impose a reservation, understanding, or declaration on new 
or existing treaties, limiting future efforts at unilateral presidential terminations unless the 
termination is plainly ‘for cause.’” Id. 
 295. Bradley & Goldsmith, Constitutional Issues, supra note 274. 
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mean that he could terminate a treaty even in the face of a restrictive 
congressional directive” and even in Youngstown Category Three.296  
But these analyses assume that a NATO (or other treaty) 
withdrawal prohibition becomes enacted law, either via presidential 
signature or through presidential veto followed by congressional 
override.297 What happens if Congress passes a NATO withdrawal 
prohibition by a majority vote of both houses, the president vetoes the 
bill, and Congress fails to override the veto? Is Congress’s opposition 
then rendered a constitutional nullity? The Youngstown canon 
suggests not. As the discussion above demonstrates, the underlying 
allocation of constitutional authority over treaty termination is 
ambiguous and unsettled, which triggers application of the 
Youngstown canon. Thus, the authority of the president to withdraw 
the United States from NATO should be narrowly construed.  
Unlike Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II),298 where President 
Barack Obama acted in defiance of an enacted statute,299 the president 
would be acting in defiance of unperfected congressional opposition—
that is, in defiance of a bill that did not become law because of a 
presidential veto and Congress’s failure to override. The president 
would therefore not officially be in Youngstown Category Three as 
Obama was in Zivotofsky II, but the constitutional analysis would be 
similar. A court or executive branch lawyer evaluating the unilateral 
withdrawal from NATO would have to specify the scope of the 
 
 296. Id.; see also Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 282, at 824 (noting that if treaty 
termination is “a concurrent power shared with either the full Congress or the Senate, then either 
Congress or the Senate could potentially place limitations on it” and a president defying such 
limitations would fall within Youngstown Category Three); Curtis A. Bradley, Exiting 
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 DUKE L.J. 1615, 1644 (2018) (“If termination is, as it 
appears to be, a concurrent rather than exclusive power, Congress can regulate it.”). 
 297. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Constitutional Issues, supra note 274 (“We cannot imagine 
Trump signing the NATO Support Act into law. But the bill passed in the House by a margin 
sufficient to override a veto, and the bill in the Senate might have similar support.”). 
 298. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).  
 299. Congress passed the statute at issue—the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Year 2003—but in signing it into law, Bush issued a signing statement declaring that if the relevant 
provision allowing U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem to have their passports list their place of birth 
as “Jerusalem, Israel” was “mandatory rather than advisory,” it would “‘impermissibly interfere 
with the President’s constitutional authority to formulate the position of the United States, speak 
for the Nation in international affairs, and determine the terms on which recognition is given to 
foreign states.” See id. at 2082 (quoting Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1698 (Sept. 30, 2002)). 
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president’s termination power as to this particular treaty. And the odds 
seem stacked against the president.  
NATO termination would not involve the president’s 
constitutional power over recognition of foreign sovereigns, an 
authority derived from the power to “receive Ambassadors”300 and one 
that the Supreme Court in Zivotofsky II held was exclusive to the 
president.301 Zivotofsky II suggests that the president may have power 
to terminate treaties incident to recognition decisions, like Carter’s 
termination of the Taiwan treaty in conjunction with recognizing the 
People’s Republic of China, but the Court declined the executive 
branch’s invitation to acknowledge a broader exclusive foreign affairs 
power.302 Instead, the Court explained that “[t]he Curtiss–Wright case 
does not extend so far as the Secretary suggests,” and that “[a] 
formulation broader than the rule that the President alone determines 
what nations to formally recognize as legitimate—and that he 
consequently controls his statements on matters of recognition—
presents different issues and is unnecessary to the resolution of this 
case.”303 Moreover, the North Atlantic Treaty was concluded as an 
Article II treaty, requiring advice and consent by two-thirds of the 
Senate304 and suggesting an understanding by the executive that mutual 
defense is an area shared by Congress and the executive, as befitting a 
legislature empowered to declare war, provide and maintain armed 
forces, and make rules for such armed forces.305 The Youngstown canon 
provides a principled rationale to justify narrowly construing the 
president’s authority to terminate NATO in light of this constellation 
of factors. A scenario in which Congress has tried to object to the 
president’s actions but is prevented from fully perfecting that 
opposition is not one in which courts should broadly construe 
presidential power.  
Recent doctrinal shifts suggest that courts might be prepared to 
adjudicate the merits of future treaty termination cases. In Zivotofsky 
 
 300. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (specifying that the president “shall receive Ambassadors and 
other public Ministers”). 
 301. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2088 (“[A] fair reading of the cases shows that the President’s 
role in the recognition process is both central and exclusive.”). 
 302. Id. at 2089. 
 303. Id.  
 304. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 
U.N.T.S. 243. 
 305. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–14.  
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v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I),306 the Supreme Court narrowed the political 
question doctrine in a way that strongly suggests that the 
constitutionality of treaty termination is now justiciable.307 Zivotofsky I 
focused solely on the first two prongs of the political question doctrine 
set out in Baker v. Carr,308 namely the existence of a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of an issue to a coordinate 
political department and a lack of judicially discoverable or 
manageable standards.309 The opinion ignored and apparently demoted 
or eliminated the other Baker factors, including “an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.”310 Rehnquist’s opinion in 
Goldwater was not clear about which of the Baker factors the Justices 
believed treaty termination to implicate.311 To the extent that 
subsequent courts believe that treaty termination involves only the 
later (and lesser) Baker factors, Zivotofsky I suggests that courts 
should decide the merits of the treaty termination question.  
In light of this analysis, executive branch lawyers should also 
consider congressional action in opposition to treaty termination in 
analyzing whether the president may proceed with a termination. 
Congressional opposition—even if not expressed in a veto override—
should matter to executive branch lawyers’ assessment of the scope of 
their client’s constitutional authority. Congressional objections may 
not be dispositive, but neither should they be ignored. They should 
matter not just in an assessment of the policy wisdom of a treaty 
termination but also as a matter of constitutional construction.  
D. The Scope of Federal Preemption 
The Youngstown canon may also be relevant to determining the 
preemptive scope of federal law. In cases about the scope of federal 
 
 306. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189 (2012). 
 307. Id. at 195; see Koh, Presidential Power, supra note 266, at 445 (“Under Zivotofsky I’s 
narrowed two-pronged political question test, treaty termination is not a political question.”). 
Standing would remain an additional, though perhaps surmountable, hurdle. 
 308. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 309. See Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 195 (discussing the first two Baker factors). 
 310. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 311. Cf. Harlan Grant Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 49 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 1, 13 (2017) (“To the extent Justice Rehnquist was applying the Baker factors, he seemed 
to be scrunching all six into a ball . . . .”). 
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preemption of state law, the Supreme Court has considered the extent 
to which the president was acting with the support of Congress and 
appears to have expanded the scope of federal preemption on that 
basis.312 In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,313 the Court 
considered whether federal law preempted a Massachusetts law that 
prohibited state agencies from purchasing goods or services from 
entities “doing business with Burma” (Myanmar).314 After 
Massachusetts passed its law, Congress passed a law that “impos[ed] a 
set of mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma.”315 The law 
empowered the president to impose additional sanctions on Burma if 
the Burmese government engaged in repression of democratic 
opponents,316 instructed him to develop a strategy to promote 
democracy and human rights in Burma, and authorized him to waive 
the sanctions if their imposition contravened U.S. national security 
interests.317 After finding that Burma had “committed large-scale 
repression of the democratic opposition,” President Bill Clinton issued 
an executive order imposing additional sanctions, prohibiting, among 
other things, any new investment in Burma by U.S. persons.318  
The National Foreign Trade Council, which represented 
businesses covered by the Massachusetts law, sued, claiming that the 
 
 312. In earlier work, I argued that the Court’s consideration of congressional objections to 
presidential action in determining the preemptive scope of federal law constitutes a reason for 
Congress to object to presidential actions with which it disagrees, even if such disagreement does 
not directly defeat or halt the actions. See Eichensehr, Conduct of Foreign Relations, supra note 
15, at 651 n.195 (arguing that “if Congress and the president disagree, courts may use the 
disagreement as a justification for finding a narrower scope for federal preemption, leaving states 
with more freedom to act,” and therefore that Congress should “disagree with President Trump—
and . . . do so vocally—on issues like withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement,” because 
“[e]ven if Congress’s opposition does not stop the presidential action, it might have the more 
indirect effect of shrinking the preemptive scope of federal power to allow state initiatives to 
proceed”). 
 313. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 314. Id. at 367. The country’s government changed its name from “Burma” to “Myanmar” in 
1989. See Thomas Fuller, Burma? Myanmar? New Freedom To Debate Includes Name, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 4, 2012), https://nyti.ms/UHE3jO [https://perma.cc/6MSM-UMJD]. I use “Burma” 
here for consistency with the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court noted that it uses “Burma,” 
as did the lower court, because “both parties and amici curiae, the state law, and the federal law 
all do so” and that its “use of this term . . . is not intended to express any political view.” Crosby, 
530 U.S. at 366 n.1.  
 315. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 368. 
 316. Id. at 369. 
 317. Id. at 369–70. 
 318. Id. at 370 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13047, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1998)). 
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federal sanctions regime preempted the state law.319 The Supreme 
Court agreed. In an opinion by Justice David Souter, the Court held 
that the Massachusetts law stood as “an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of Congress’s full objectives under the federal Act.”320 
The Court focused on the fact that Congress intended “to provide the 
President with flexible and effective authority over economic sanctions 
against Burma,” empowering him to both increase and decrease the 
sanctions in particular circumstances.321 Citing Youngstown’s 
description of Category One, the Court noted that “the statute has 
placed the President in a position with as much discretion to exercise 
economic leverage against Burma, with an eye toward national 
security, as our law will admit.”322 The Court concluded that “it is just 
this plenitude of Executive authority that we think controls the issue of 
preemption here,”323 and required the Massachusetts law, which 
reached more broadly than the federal sanctions, to yield.324 Otherwise, 
the Massachusetts law would “undermine[] the President’s intended 
statutory authority by making it impossible for him to restrain fully the 
coercive power of the national economy when he may choose to take 
the discretionary action open to him.”325  
Again citing Youngstown Category One, the Court also held that 
the Massachusetts statute was an obstacle to the federal sanctions law 
because it impeded the president’s ability to fulfill Congress’s directive 
to cooperate with other countries in a strategy to advance democracy 
in Burma.326 The Court explained that “Congress’s express command 
to the President to take the initiative for the United States among the 
international community invested him with the maximum authority of 
the National Government in harmony with the President’s own 
constitutional powers.”327 This addition by Congress of its power to that 
 
 319. Id. at 370–71. 
 320. Id. at 373.  
 321. Id. at 374. 
 322. Id. at 375–76. 
 323. Id. at 376. 
 324. Id. at 376–77.  
 325. Id. at 377. The Court also cited the fact that the Massachusetts law stood as an obstacle 
to the federal sanctions by interfering with Congress’s intent “to limit economic pressure against 
the Burmese Government to a specific range” and instead reaching considerably more broadly. 
Id. at 377–79.  
 326. Id. at 380. 
 327. Id. at 381 (citations omitted) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel 
Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)). 
EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2021  9:06 PM 
1312  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1245 
of the president, the Court explained, “belies any suggestion that 
Congress intended the President’s effective voice to be obscured by 
state or local action.”328  
The Court’s strong suggestion in these two holdings is that the fact 
that the president was in Youngstown Category One, acting pursuant 
to express authorization by Congress, caused the Court to interpret the 
preemptive scope of the federal statute relatively broadly. Of course, 
having the president in Youngstown Category One is not a prerequisite 
for presidential action to preempt state law; the president’s 
independent constitutional authorities, particularly with respect to 
foreign relations, are sometimes sufficient to displace state law.329 
Nonetheless, the Court in Crosby treated Congress’s authorization of 
the president’s actions as a plus factor in determining the federal 
sanctions’ preemptive scope. Having crossed the bridge of considering 
the horizontal allocation of powers among branches of the federal 
government in a case about the vertical allocation of powers between 
the federal government and the states, it is only a small step from 
considering congressional authorization of presidential action to 
considering congressional opposition to presidential action in a similar 
circumstance.  
Take a hypothetical case in which the president seeks 
congressional support for a particular action that would preempt state 
laws, and Congress instead passes a bill prohibiting the president from 
taking the suggested action and expressing support for state initiatives 
in the area. The president then vetoes the bill and takes executive 
action on his own authority, claiming his constitutional powers 
standing alone are sufficient to support the action. When a court 
adjudicates the preemptive scope of the president’s action, it might 
hold that the president lacks all power to act independent of Congress. 
But if, instead, the court believes the president has some power, what 
is it to make of Congress’s passage of a prohibition on the president’s 
action? The Youngstown canon instructs that, just as the Supreme 
 
 328. Id. 
 329. Cf. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 n.14 (2003) (explaining that although 
“[i]t is true that the President in this case is acting without express congressional authority, and 
thus does not have the ‘plenitude of Executive authority’ that ‘controll[ed] the issue of 
preemption’ in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376 (2000),” the Court in 
Crosby was “careful to note that the President possesses considerable independent constitutional 
authority to act on behalf of the United States on international issues . . . and conflict with the 
exercise of that authority is a comparably good reason to find preemption of state law” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
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Court in Crosby looked to Congress’s authorization of presidential 
action as a plus in construing the preemptive scope of federal law, the 
court in the hypothetical should take into account Congress’s 
opposition to narrow the preemptive scope of the president’s action.  
The difference in the two scenarios, of course, is that in Crosby the 
congressional action was perfected into law, whereas in the 
hypothetical, Congress failed to override the president’s veto, 
rendering Congress’s prohibitory bill not law. This is a significant 
difference. But even so, the congressional action in both cases is the 
same: passage by a majority vote of both houses. The difference is the 
approval (or lack thereof) of the president. What the Court relied on 
in Crosby was Congress’s view of the president’s authority. Such views 
are not—and need not be—expressed only via enacted law, which 
necessarily depends on the views of the president as well. If, as Crosby 
suggests, what is relevant to a court’s analysis of the unsettled questions 
about the scope of the federal government’s power vis-à-vis states is 
the views of Congress—a co-equal branch of the federal government, 
and the one designed to reflect and respect states’ interests—then the 
president’s views should not be determinative. Rather, when the 
underlying constitutional allocation of power between the federal 
government and the states is unclear, courts should take into account 
Congress’s views of the scope of federal power, even where such views 
conflict with those of the executive.  
When considering the scope of federal power to preempt state 
action, courts should consider congressional agreement or 
disagreement with the executive action doing the putative preempting. 
Doing so appropriately shades the constitutional inquiry based on the 
views of the branch of the federal government designed to protect 
states’ interests and avoids entirely ceding the field to the executive, 
the branch designed to favor federal power.  
*   *   * 
These examples illustrate some of the different ways the 
Youngstown canon of construction can apply. In some circumstances, 
the canon counsels in favor of narrowly construing a prior ambiguous 
statutory authorization in light of subsequent congressional attempts 
to limit the authorization’s scope, deny its application to particular 
facts, or repeal it entirely. The AUMF, NEA, and preemption 
examples best demonstrate these statute-focused approaches. In other 
cases, the fact of congressional objection to presidential action, as 
EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2021  9:06 PM 
1314  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1245 
evidenced by a vetoed bill, functions as an input into assessing the 
boundaries of shared constitutional power. In these constitutionally 
focused cases, vetoed bills can show nonacquiescence by Congress to 
broad claims of executive power or disrupt executive claims that there 
is an unbroken practice as required for historical gloss arguments. 
There, the Youngstown canon counsels in favor of narrowly construing 
the ambiguous constitutional authority the executive claims in a 
manner akin to constitutional avoidance. The examples of treaty 
termination and war powers based on the president’s Article II 
authority best illustrate these types of application of the canon. 
Stepping back from particular applications shows that judges and other 
interpreters can deploy the Youngstown canon, like many canons, in a 
variety of ways to suit differing interpretive contexts and approaches. 
III.  CONCERNS AND CONSEQUENCES 
This Part addresses several possible concerns with and 
consequences of adopting the Youngstown canon. It concludes by 
addressing the incentives the canon creates for Congress.  
A. Cheap Talk and Symbolic Voting 
One possible concern with the Youngstown canon is that it gives 
interpretive weight to actions that Congress intended to be cheap talk 
or symbolic voting. One might argue that legislators did not intend 
vetoed bills and joint resolutions to be taken seriously and would not 
have passed them but for the fact that they knew the president would 
veto them. The bills and resolutions, the argument goes, were meant to 
be symbolic rebukes of the president, but nothing more, so it would be 
inconsistent with Congress’s intent to give the congressional actions 
interpretive weight.  
This argument depends on a number of assumptions, which do not 
necessarily hold. First, vetoed bills and resolutions aren’t really cheap. 
The cost of vetoed bills or resolutions can be considered at the level of 
the institution or at the level of individual legislators. With respect to 
Congress as an institution, the vetoed bills and resolutions have 
potentially significant opportunity costs. They take time and effort that 
could be devoted to other legislative priorities.330 They are also costly 
 
 330. Cf. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 589 (making the point about simple and 
concurrent resolutions that “[p]assing resolutions is costly: it takes time that could be used for 
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for individual legislators, who must (one hopes, at least) spend time 
learning about and considering the bill or resolution—time the 
legislators could have spent on other legislative efforts, constituent 
services, fundraising, or campaigning.331 Legislative leaders or other 
proponents of the bill or resolution might also incur costs through log 
rolls or horse trades in the process of negotiating for other legislators’ 
affirmative votes. Marginal voters may in fact be among the most 
invested in the process of passage—not because of what it costs them 
to get the bill passed, but because of what they stand to gain in 
exchange for their affirmative votes.  
Yet another type of cost associated with vetoed bills comes from 
the layering on of party politics.332 Passage of a bill that the president 
ultimately vetoes may be an especially credible signal of congressional 
commitment when the same party controls the presidency and one or 
both houses of Congress.333 There, congressional votes cannot be 
dismissed as mere party politics posturing because they reveal a 
divergence among members of the same party. This was the case with 
the Yemen, Iran, and southern border resolutions discussed above. 
The Republican-controlled Senate passed them, and the Republican 
Trump administration vetoed them.334 Where a veto comes in response 
 
other things,” such as “passing legislation”). Gersen and Posner argue, “it is incorrect to say that 
the simple resolution is cheap talk and therefore not credible; it entails some positive cost less 
than the cost of enacting a statute but more than the cost of a legislative speech.” Id. at 597. The 
joint resolutions and other bills that this paper addresses are statutes-in-waiting, so to the extent 
that the arguments that simple and concurrent resolutions are costly are persuasive, they are even 
more true for the bills and joint resolutions that this Article addresses.  
 331. Cf. id. at 589 (noting that passing soft law instruments takes time away from “engaging 
in constituent service, meeting supporters, enjoying leisure”—activities that “benefit members of 
Congress either directly or by improving their chances for reelection”). 
 332. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text (discussing how bipartisan congressional 
opposition to a president may strengthen the case for applying the Youngstown canon). 
 333. In assessing historical gloss on executive power, the executive branch itself has cited 
concurrence in the practice by presidents of different political parties as a point in favor of the 
existence of a presidential power. See Deployment of U.S. Armed Forced into Haiti, supra note 
221, at 178 (“Such a pattern of executive conduct, made under claim of right, extended over many 
decades and engaged in by Presidents of both parties, ‘evidences the existence of broad 
constitutional power.’” (quoting Presidential Power To Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without 
Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 187 (1980))). Similarly, bipartisan disagreement with 
a president’s claim of power might be particularly persuasive evidence of its nonexistence.  
 334. Cf. Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Lessons from 
Hamdan, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1451, 1467 (2007) (noting that with “unified government with parties 
that are coalitions” the president can lose because “there is some chance that the minority party 
may be able to pull away enough members of the President’s (coalitional) party for the minority 
party to prevail on specific issues”).  
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to an action by a Congress or a house of Congress that is controlled by 
the same party as the president, the bill might be understood to signal 
a particularly credible commitment by Congress—one worth splitting 
a political party and incurring some political ramifications.335  
A second assumption built into the cheap talk concern is that 
legislators know with certainty that the president will veto a bill or joint 
resolution. And that is not always the case. Many presidents have 
declined to veto bills with which they have concerns, even 
constitutional concerns, in favor of issuing a signing statement setting 
out constitutional objections and declining to enforce particular 
portions of bills.336 Such a move might be particularly likely if Congress 
bundles the provisions to which the president objects into must-pass 
legislation, like defense funding bills or budget bills. In other words, 
what may in retrospect, after a presidential veto, look like 
congressional cheap talk or symbolic voting may very well have been 
less clearly so ex ante.  
B. Notice and Retroactive Applicability 
A second possible concern with adoption of the Youngstown 
canon might stem from lack of notice to Congress that vetoed bills and 
resolutions would be used as interpretive aids. On this rationale, and 
related to the cheap talk point above, Congress may not have passed 
vetoed bills if it had known that such bills would be used to construe 
constitutional or statutory powers. Thus, applying the canon to bills or 
resolutions passed and vetoed before the canon’s adoption would 
unfairly surprise Congress or fail to reflect congressional intent.  
This concern reaches more broadly than the Youngstown canon to 
all canons that courts announce and apply retroactively.337 And the 
 
 335. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 15, at 2352 (explaining that under unified government, 
“[f]or Congress to respond to executive initiatives is to give the opposition party an opportunity 
to call into question, criticize, or potentially embarrass the President” and “run the risk that 
unpleasant facts will be revealed in congressional deliberations or that blame for failures will fall 
on the party as a whole”). 
 336. For an overview of recent presidential uses of signing statements, including to raise 
constitutional objections, see generally TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33667, 
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
(2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5YK-SRYD]. 
 337. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The New Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 133 HARV. 
L. REV. 1582, 1584 (2020) (noting that “[t]he retroactive application of changed canons to statutes 
enacted before the changes may result in interpretations that are different from the ones the 
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Supreme Court creates or alters and then retroactively applies canons 
and other interpretive rules with some frequency.338 To take just one 
example, when the Court announced the federalism canon in Gregory 
v. Ashcroft339 in 1991, it applied the canon to construe the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act as amended in 1974.340 In any such 
circumstance, one could argue that Congress did not have fair notice 
of how the courts would interpret its work and might have acted 
differently if it had.  
In the case of the Youngstown canon, however, the concern has 
less force. The canon effectively gives Congress at least a fraction of 
what its actions suggest that it wants. The Youngstown canon takes 
Congress at its word that it sought to make law—despite being 
thwarted by the presidential veto—and gives it something less, but still 
something, in the form of interpretive consideration. The Youngstown 
canon should be less of a surprise to Congress and would afford more 
respect to the legislature as an institution than other canons, like clear 
statement rules, that the Supreme Court creates or alters in ways that 
often appear to thwart congressional intent.341 
 
enacting Congresses would have expected” and that “[t]his problem has received little 
attention”). 
 338. See, e.g., id. at 1589–1614 (tracing the significant changes over time in the presumption 
against extraterritoriality); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 87, at 619 (explaining that in the 1980s, 
the Supreme Court “not only created new canons reflecting federalism-based values, but also 
transformed some of the existing clear statement rules into super-strong clear statement rules”); 
id. at 619–29 (tracing the evolution of various federalism-related canons throughout the 1980s). 
 339. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 340. See id. at 464–65 (discussing an amendment to the statute); id. at 470 (explaining that 
absent a “plain statement” by Congress, the Court “will not attribute to Congress an intent to 
intrude on state governmental functions”). For an additional example in a similar vein, see 
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242–46 (1985), which holds that “Congress must 
express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the 
statute itself” and applies this super-strong clear statement rule against abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity to a statute amended in relevant part seven years earlier. 
 341. One could cite numerous examples where Congress legislates to accomplish something 
under existing interpretive rules, only to have the Supreme Court later alter its rules and apply 
them retroactively, sending Congress back to the drawing board to try again to accomplish what 
it thought it did in the first statute. This issue seems particularly acute when Congress transforms 
a regular presumption into a clear statement rule or a clear statement rule into a super-strong 
clear statement rule. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 280–82 (1994) (chronicling how, in drafting Title VII, Congress relied on the 
Supreme Court’s characterization of the presumption against extraterritoriality as a presumption, 
only to have the Court in a later case (EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 
244 (1991)) transform the presumption into a clear statement rule and hold that the preexisting 
statute did not satisfy the new rule); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 87, at 638 (criticizing the 
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C. Effects of Canon Adoption on Congressional Action 
A final potential concern or at least curiosity is the flip side of the 
concern about springing a canon on Congress: What will Congress do 
after courts and other interpreters adopt the Youngstown canon? Will 
the canon lead Congress to attempt to pass, and have vetoed, more bills 
and joint resolutions or fewer? This is an empirical question that 
cannot be answered definitively at this point. But it is possible to 
hypothesize different results.  
If the cheap talk critique discussed above is correct, the canon 
could result in fewer attempts by Congress to restrain the president. 
Along these lines, vetoed bills are currently simply symbolic actions by 
Congress, and once senators and representatives realize that their 
supposed cheap talk might have interpretive consequences, they will 
cease putting forth bills in this vein that the president will veto. As 
explained above, I am skeptical of the premises underlying the 
symbolic voting hypothesis, and so I am also skeptical that the canon 
would cause a decrease in vetoed bills. But it’s possible.  
At the opposite extreme, perhaps the canon will incentivize more 
attempts by Congress to push back against or restrain the president, 
despite the likelihood of presidential vetoes. On this logic, Congress is 
currently insufficiently incentivized to attempt such actions because of 
the veto threat and the understanding that vetoed bills are effectively 
nullities. Why expend time and resources to pass something that will 
come to naught? If that is true, then adopting the canon could realign 
congressional incentives in favor of attempting to push back against or 
restrain the president more often. The canon counsels that despite a 
presidential veto, Congress may get some bang for its buck by having 
majoritarian opposition taken into account in interpreting an 
ambiguous constitutional or statutory authority.342  
 
Court’s revision of the presumption against extraterritoriality into a clear statement rule in 
Aramco as “strongly countermajoritarian” because it frustrated apparent congressional intent 
about the scope of Title VII’s application); see also id. at 639 (noting that the Court’s creation and 
application of a super-strong clear statement rule with respect to abrogation of state’s immunity 
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment was “extraordinarily countermajoritarian” and that it 
“took Congress three statutes and fifteen years to accomplish what Congress probably thought it 
had done in 1975” when it initially passed the statute at issue). 
 342. Cf. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 612 (arguing with respect to simple and 
concurrent resolutions that “[g]iven that courts rarely permit Congress to offer interpretations of 
earlier statutes by passing resolutions, there is no reason for Congress to enact them,” but “[i]f 
judicial practice changed, congressional behavior would likely shift as well”). 
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Rounding out the potential effects of the Youngstown canon on 
congressional behavior is the possibility that adopting the canon would 
have . . . no effect. In their seminal study of congressional knowledge 
of canons of statutory interpretation, Gluck and Bressman show that 
there is wide variance in congressional staffers’ knowledge about 
different canons, by name or by concept.343 This lack of knowledge 
extends to such venerable canons as the rule of lenity.344 The same fate 
could befall the Youngstown canon, in which case it would have no 
effect on Congress’s behavior. On the other hand, Gluck and 
Bressman’s study reveals that congressional staffers are very familiar 
with the federalism canon and the presumption against 
preemption345—both of which are, like the Youngstown canon, aimed 
at protecting structural constitutional values. Gluck and Bressman cite 
this finding as “the first evidence that some kind of courts-Congress 
interpretive feedback loop does exist, at least with respect to certain 
interpretive rules,” and that “[k]nowing that the courts consider these 
federalism presumptions . . . has an effect both on the substance of 
statutes and on how that substance is expressed.”346 These findings may 
suggest that interpretive principles related to structural constitutional 
issues are comparatively high-salience for Congress and thus more 
likely than many interpretive principles to affect congressional 
behavior.  
Although it is impossible to determine ex ante how or if Congress 
would react to adoption of the Youngstown canon, one thing the canon 
could do is remove a possible disincentive for Congress to attempt to 
act via legislation. Scholars have previously argued for considering soft 
law, especially simple and concurrent resolutions, as interpretive aids, 
but they have not discussed or considered vetoed bills in a similar 
context.347 By showing the equivalence or even superiority of vetoed 
bills to other forms of congressional soft law, this Article aims to 
 
 343. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 53, at 927–29; see also Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. 
Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 
614–15 (2002) (concluding, based on a study of the Senate Judiciary Committee, that “canons of 
statutory construction are not systematically a central part of the drafting enterprise in which 
staffers participate, nor, for that matter, is interpretive research more generally”). 
 344. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 53, at 946–47. 
 345. Id. at 942 (reporting that “[a]pproximately 80% of . . . respondents . . . were familiar with 
one of these rules by name and approximately 50% said they were familiar with both,” and noting 
that “[o]f . . . respondents who were familiar with at least one of these presumptions, 65% said 
that at least one played a role when drafting”). 
 346. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 347. See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text (discussing prior scholarship on soft law).  
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decrease the incentives for Congress to attempt to push back against 
the executive via only non-binding resolutions when a potentially 
binding mechanism of a bill or a joint resolution is available. To the 
extent that congressional drafters might have perceived that courts or 
other interpreters would give greater weight to concurrent resolutions 
than to vetoed bills or joint resolutions, this Article levels the playing 
field and provides a roadmap for ensuring that Congress’s views are 
considered, even if the president exercises a veto. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Youngstown is a canonical case, it is not yet a canon of 
construction. But it should be. After decades of drift in power toward 
the executive, helped along by the courts, the time has come for at least 
a modest rebalancing. The proposed Youngstown canon rewards 
Congress for overcoming structural and political hurdles to assert its 
institutional prerogatives. It respects existing Supreme Court 
precedents. And it gives judges, executive branch lawyers, and other 
interpreters a clear roadmap for taking into account democratically 
legitimate, majoritarian action by the legislative branch. 
